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INTRODUCTION
Jurisdiction over a parent corporation based on the ownership
of a subsidiary1 has long been an unsettled issue. Plaintiffs
frequently sue the parent corporation as well as the subsidiary for
claims arising out of the actions of the subsidiary. Bringing suit
against the parent can be especially important when the assets of
the subsidiary are insufficient for complete recovery. Many times,
such suits are brought in the forum in which the actions arose or
where the subsidiary has its principal place of business. However,
because corporations are always subject tojurisdiction in their states
of incorporation,2 the claims against the parent and subsidiary will
sometimes be brought in the subsidiary's state of incorporation.
Subsidiaries are often created for the purpose of limiting the
liability of the parent corporation. The principle of limited
corporate liability is deeply rooted in corporate law and is justified
in terms of economic efficiency.8 Nonresident parent corpora-
tions4 often have minimal contacts with the states of incorporation
t B.A. 1989, Amherst College;J.D. Candidate 1993, University of Pennsylvania.
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1 For the purposes of this Comment, a subsidiary is defined as a corporation that
is at least 50% owned by another corporation (the parent).
2 See 9 WILLIAM M. FLETCHER, FLETCHER CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE
CORPORATIONS § 4309 (perm. ed. rev. vol. 1985) [hereinafter FLETCHER]. In federal
diversity actions, corporations are deemed to be citizens of both their states of
incorporation and their places of principal business for purposes ofjurisdiction. See
1 JAMES W. MOORE ET AL., MOORE's FEDERAL PRACTICE 1 0.771] (2d ed. 1992)
(pointing out that corporations have dual citizenship under the 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c)
(1958) amendment).
3 See infra notes 85-92 and accompanying text.
4 For the purposes of this Comment, a nonresident corporation is simply a
corporation which is not incorporated in the state in question. The term "nonresi-
dent corporation" includes both domestic corporations (which are incorporated in
another state) and foreign corporations (which are incorporated under the laws of
another country). This distinction will typically be of little legal significance. In some
cases, however, obtaining jurisdiction over a foreign corporation may be more
difficult. See infra notes 45, 51-54 and accompanying text.
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of their subsidiaries. 5 Yet a nonresident parent corporation that is
forced to litigate claims against it or its subsidiary in its subsidiary's
state of incorporation faces the additional costs and burdens
associated with having to litigate in a forum with which the parent
may have virtually no contacts. 6 The imposition of such burdens
on the nonresident parent corporation undermines the very purpose
of creating the subsidiary-namely, limiting the parent's liability.
Delaware, for legal and financial reasons, is the state of
incorporation of many American corporations. 7 As a result of
Delaware's attractiveness as a corporate domicile, nonresident
parent corporations that choose to create subsidiaries often do so
in Delaware. Clearly, whether these nonresident parent corpora-
tions will be subject to Delaware's jurisdictional reach and forced to
incur the costs of litigating there is an issue of major consequence
to them. Because so many Delaware corporations are subsidiaries
of nonresident parent corporations, Delaware courts have had
ample opportunity to address the specific issue of whether it is
constitutional to assert jurisdiction over a nonresident parent in the
subsidiary's state of incorporation.
This Comment examines the constitutiopal validity of subjecting
a nonresident parent corporation to jurisdiction in its subsidiary's
state of incorporation. Part I sets forth the United States Supreme
Court's guidelines for exercising jurisdiction over nonresident
parties. This discussion includes an analysis of how lower courts
have applied those guidelines when parent and subsidiary corpora-
tions are involved. Part If begins by summarizing the principles
applicable to determining whether the exercise of jurisdiction over
a nonresident parent corporation in its subsidiary's state of
incorporation is constitutional. The analysis then turns to some
recent Delaware decisions which, in upholding the assertion of
jurisdiction over nonresident parent corporations, interpret the
5 It is often the case that the subsidiary will have no business connection to its
state of incorporation and the parent corporation will have no connection to that
state whatsoever, other than having purchased or incorporated the subsidiary at some
point in time.
6 See infra note 92 and accompanying text.
7 SeeJonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, Toward an Interest-Group Theory of
Delaware Corporate Law, 65 TEx. L. REV. 469, 483 (1987) (pointing out that over 40%
of New York Stock Exchange corporations are incorporated in Delaware and that 82%
of corporations that reincorporate choose to do so in Delaware). Delaware's appeal
as a state of incorporation stems from its "attractive mix of existing corporate law
rules" and its "believable assurances that it will continue to supply such a desirable
mix of rules in the future." Id.
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reach of the Delaware courts expansively. This Comment contends
that the Delaware courts' expansive exercise of jurisdiction is
unconstitutional.
I. SUPREME COURT DOCTRINE FOR ESTABLISHING JURISDICTION
OVER NONRESIDENT PARENT CORPORATIONS
The question of whether state or federal courts have the
constitutional authority to exercise jurisdiction over a nonresident
parent corporation based on its ownership or incorporation of a
subsidiary in the forum state has never been directly addressed by
the United States Supreme Court. Two lines of cases have, however,
shed some light on the issue. In Cannon Manufacturing Co. v.
Cudahy Packing Co., 8 the Court dealt directly with the general issue
of jurisdiction in the context of a parent-subsidiary relationship.
After Cannon, a series of cases beginning with International Shoe Co.
v. Washington9 have defined constitutional due process limitations
on exerting jurisdiction over nonresident parties.
A. The Cannon Doctrine
In Cannon, a North Carolina corporation, Cannon Manufactur-
ing Co. ("Cannon"), sought to bring an action in North Carolina
against Cudahy Packing Company ("Cudahy"), a Maine corporation.
Cannon attempted to serve process on Cudahy by delivering the
summons and complaint to the Cudahy Packing Company of
Alabama ("Cudahy Alabama"), an Alabama corporation which was
a wholly owned subsidiary of Cudahy. 10 Cudahy Alabama kept an
office in North Carolina through which it conducted business in
that state."1 Cudahy objected to service on the grounds that it was
not doing business in North Carolina at the time. 12 Cannon ar-
gued that Cudahy and Cudahy Alabama should be regarded as the
8 267 U.S. 333 (1925).
9 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
1o See Cannon, 267 U.S. at 334.
u See id. at 335.
12 The applicable jurisdiction test at the time of the Court's decision in Cannon
was whether or not the defendant was present and doing business in the forum state.
See id. at 334-35; Bank of Am. v. Whitney Cent. Nat'l Bank, 261 U.S. 171, 172 (1923);
see also 4 CHARLEs A. WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE § 1066 (2d ed. 1987) (discussing the "corporate presence" and "doing
business" theories ofjurisdiction).
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same entity for jurisdictional purposes.1
5
The Court rejected Cannon's argument and ruled that corporate
separation was not to be ignored in the jurisdictional context.
Relying on federal common law precedents, the Court noted that
the use of a subsidiary to conduct business in the forum state was
not sufficient to subject the parent corporation to that state's
jurisdiction. 4 According to the Court, the corporate separation
between Cudahy and Cudahy Alabama was "in all respects ob-
served," in that all transactions between the two corporations were
recorded as if they were "wholly independent corporations."
5
Thus, Justice Brandeis wrote, "[t]he corporate separation, though
perhaps merely formal, was real. It was not pure fiction."16 In
this context, the Court held that Cudahy was not subject to
jurisdiction in North Carolina.
17
Although the Court stated that no question of constitutionality
13 See Cannon, 267 U.S. at 335.
14 See id. at 336 (citing People's Tobacco Co. v. American Tobacco Co., 246 U.S.
79 (1918); Peterson v. Chicago, Rock Island & Pac. Ry., 205 U.S. 364 (1907); and
Conley v. Mathieson Alkali Works, 190 U.S. 406 (1903)). Justice Brandeis left open
the possibility that Cannon might have been decided differently if Cudahy's liability
for an act or omission of Cudahy Alabama had been at issue: "There is here no
attempt to hold the defendant liable for an act or omission of its subsidiary ....
Hence, cases concerning substantive rights ... have no application." Id. at 337
(citations omitted). Subsequent interpretations of Cannon, however, have ruled that
the separation between a parent and subsidiary should be recognized forjurisdiction-
al purposes even if the parent's substantive liability for an act or omission of the
subsidiary is at issue. See infra notes 60-68 and accompanying text.
15 Cannon, 267 U.S. at 335.
16 Id. at 337. Courts today might have reached a different conclusion regarding
the corporate separation between Cudahyand CudahyAlabama, given that the Court
in Cannon acknowledged that Cudahy "dominated" Cudahy Alabama "completely."
Id. at 335; see infra notes 75-84 and accompanying text.
17 See Cannon, 267 U.S. at 338. The Court in Cannon discussed the concepts of
"service of process" and jurisdiction" interchangeably. In Cannon, service on Cudahy
was improper because the summons was delivered to Cudahy Alabama, rather than
Cudahy. Cannon's holding, however, goes beyond dismissing the action on the
grounds of improper service: even if Cudahy had somehow been properly served,
Cudahy would not have been subject tojurisdiction in North Carolina because it was
not "present" or "doing business" in North Carolina. Thus, a nonresident party is not
necessarily subject to a forum'sjurisdiction even if service of process is effected in an
apparently proper manner. See also Gallagher v. Mazda Motor of Am., Inc., 781 F.
Supp. 1079, 1083 n.7 (E.D. Pa. 1992) (noting that even if the defendant could be
properly served under the Hague Convention, plaintiffs would still have to show that
defendant was subject to the forum's jurisdiction). This Comment discusses the
circumstances under which courts can constitutionally exercise jurisdiction over a
nonresident parent corporation regardless of the manner in which service of process
is effected.
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was presented in Cannon,1 8 the doctrine that emerged from the
Court's decision (the "Cannon doctrine") has, in the eyes of some
lower courts, assumed constitutional dimensions. The doctrine is
simple: a parent that retains "formal" and "real" separation from
its subsidiary will not be subject to jurisdiction in a forum just
because the subsidiary is subject to jurisdiction in that forum.
19
Although many courts continue to adhere to the Cannon doctrine,
other courts and commentators argue that it is no longer valid,
partly because it is an example of federal common law which, in
light of more recent Supreme Court decisions, must be subordinat-
ed to state common law.
20
B. The Minimum Contacts Test of International Shoe
and its Progeny
Many commentators also argue that Cannon has been supersed-
ed by the Supreme Court's so-called "minimum contacts" analysis
first set forth in International Shoe Co. v. Washington.2 1 Instead of
dealing with jurisdictional issues based on parent-subsidiary
18 See Cannon, 267 U.S. at 336.
19 Some commentators argue that Cannon is too formalistic in the sense that the
mere existence of a parent-subsidiary relationship will almost always result in the
recognition of the corporate separation between the parent and subsidiary for
jurisdictional purposes. See PHILLIP I. BLUMBERG, THE LAW OF CORPORATE GROUPS
§ 3.03 (1983) (commenting that the formalistic Cannon approach constitutes a
"manipulation of abstractions"). The Cannon opinion does not clearly outline what
standard should be used to determine whether a parent retains formal and real
separation from its subsidiary, and the assumption that Cannon is to be applied
formalistically is debatable. In fact, lower courts that have adhered to the Cannon
doctrine often scrutinize the nature of parent-subsidiary relationships closely before
determining whether that separation should be recognized forjurisdictional purposes.
See infra notes 75-84 and accompanying text.
21 Cannon was decided before Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938). Prior
to Erie, federal courts had developed a body of "federal common law" which often
conflicted with state common law. See Murray E. Knudsen, Comment,Jurisdiction over
a Corporation Based on the Contacts of a Related Corporation: Time for a Rule of
Attribution, 92 DICK. L. REV. 917, 924 n.48 (1988). Erie requires federal courts in
diversity actions to apply the same substantive law that the forum-state's courts would
apply. See Erie, 304 U.S. at 78. Thus, in light of Eie, the Cannon doctrine's validity
is questionable since it can be considered an example of federal common law that is
now subordinate to state common law. See BLUMBERG, supra note 19, § 3.03;
Knudsen, supra, at 924.
21 326 U.S. 310 (1945); see, e.g., BLUMBERG, supra note 19, § 3.03 (arguing that the
Cannon doctrine has no constitutional relevance, especially after International Shoe);
Knudsen, supra note 20, at 924 (arguing that the current validity of Cannon is
questionable partly because it was decided prior to International Shoe, when federal
courts could only exercise jurisdiction over "persons present in the forum").
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relationships, the minimum contacts analysis focuses on whether it
is fair and reasonable to force a nonresident party to litigate in a
particular forum. International Shoe involved a shoe company
("International Shoe") which employed approximately thirteen
salesmen in the State of Washington to distribute its products
there. 22 The Washington Supreme Court held that the salesmen's
"systematic solicitation of orders" in the state was sufficient to
support a finding that International Shoe did business in Washing-
ton and was therefore amenable to suit there.2 3 In upholding the
constitutionality of the Washington Supreme Court's decision, the
United States Supreme Court held that due process required that a
nonresident party must have "certain minimum contacts with [a
forum] such that the maintenance of [a] suit [there] does not offend
'traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.'" 24 Under
this standard, the Supreme Court determined that International
Shoe's "systematic and continuous" activities in Washington
constituted sufficient contacts with the state such that it would be
"reasonable and just" to subject International Shoe to the jurisdic-
tion of the Washington courts.
25
The "minimum contacts" test of International Shoe was further
explored in the corporate context in Shaffer v. Heitner.26 In Shaffer,
the plaintiff brought a derivative suit against officers and directors
of Greyhound, a Delaware corporation. The Delaware Court of
Chancery exercised quasi in rem jurisdiction2 7 over the nonresi-
dent officers and directors by sequestering all of their stock in Grey-
hound. 28 In affirming the chancery court's ruling, the Delaware
2 See International Shoe, 326 U.S. at 313.
23 Id. at 314.
24 Id. at 316 (citation omitted).
25 Id. at 320.
26 433 U.S. 186 (1977).
27 Quasi in remjurisdiction refers to an assertion ofjurisdiction over a nonresi-
dent defendant where the contacts between the defendant and the forum state are
not necessarily related to the subject of the litigation. The theory of quasi in rem
jurisdiction is based on the notion that a state possesses exclusive jurisdiction over
property within that state's boundaries. See 4 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 12,
§ 1070. Under this theory, state courts can decide the fate of nonresident individuals'
property even when those individuals could not otherwise be forced to litigate in that
state. See id. Thus, when a nonresident defendant's property is attached or seized,
the defendant is effectively forced to litigate claims in the forum state even if those
claims are unrelated to the property, since failure to litigate the claims will result in
a default judgment on the property. See id.
21 See id. at 192. The stock of Delaware corporations is considered to be property
located in Delaware. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 169 (1991).
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Supreme Court maintained that the International Shoe minimum
contacts test was not applicable since the exercise ofjurisdiction was
"founded on the presence of capital stock here, not on prior contact
by defendants with this forum."
29
The United States Supreme Court reversed and held that the
minimum contacts test of International Shoe must be satisfied for a
state to justify the exercise of quasi in rem jurisdiction.30 States
can no longer attach a defendant's property for the purpose of
forcing the defendant to litigate in their courts when the property
is "completely unrelated to the ... cause of action."31 In Shaffer,
there was simply no relationship between the nonresident directors'
property (their Greyhound stock) and the litigation involving their
duties as directors of the corporation.
3 2
A significant result of Shaffer is that "the presence of ... [a
defendant's] property alone" no longer suffices for a state to
exercise jurisdiction.33 The Court's decision does not, however,
prevent states from exercising jurisdiction over nonresident parties
when the property itself is central to the dispute 4 or when a
controversy is related to "rights and duties growing out of" the
ownership of property within the state.3 5
While Shaffer dealt specifically with the constitutionality of quasi
in remjurisdiction, the Court enumerated some of the more general
factors courts must consider in determining whether jurisdiction
over a nonresident is appropriate in World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v.
Woodson. -36  One factor is whether a "defendant's conduct and
connection with the forum State are such that he should reasonably
2 Greyhound Corp. v. Heitner, 361 A.2d 225, 229 (1976), rev'd sub nom. Shaffer
v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186 (1977).
30 See Shaffer, 433 U.S. at 207. The Court did point out that Delaware could
exercisejurisdiction over nonresident directors or officers by other means. Delaware,
unlike other states, had not yet enacted a statute establishing acceptance of a position
as director or officer of a Delaware corporation as consent to jurisdiction in Delaware.
See id. at 216. Had such a statute been enacted,jurisdiction over the directors would
have presumably been deemed constitutional. Delaware has since enacted such a
statute. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 3114 (Supp. 1990). For a discussion of the
implications of a similar consent statute in the context of parent-subsidiary
relationships, see infra notes 152 & 184.
3' Shaffer, 433 U.S. at 209.
32 See id. at 213.
33 Id. at 209.
34 See id. at 207-08.
35 Id. at 208. Here, the Court had in mind cases in which, for example, a plaintiff
was injured on property that the defendant owned within the state. See id.
36 444 U.S. 286 (1980).
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anticipate being haled into court there."3 7 For example, a defen-
dant that has "purposefully avail[ed] itself of the privilege of
conducting activities within the forum State" should reasonably
anticipate being haled into court there for causes of action related
to those activities.38 Other relevant factors are the forum state's
interest in adjudicating the dispute, the plaintiff's interest in
obtaining relief, and the judicial system's interest in obtaining the
efficient resolution of controversies.
3 9
In a subsequent decision, Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia v.
Hall,40 the Court discussed constitutional jurisdictional require-
ments in terms of specific and general jurisdiction. "Specific"
jurisdiction is present when "a controversy is related to or 'arises
out of' a defendant's contacts with the forum."41 In order for a
court's exercise of specific jurisdiction to comport with due process,
a "relationship among the defendant, the forum, and the litigation"
is essential.4 2
Even when specific jurisdiction is absent, a state may sometimes
exercise "general" jurisdiction over a party. A party may be subject
to the general jurisdiction of a forum state even when the litigation
is completely unrelated to any activities that took place there.
43
General jurisdiction is present only when a certain level of "continu-
ous and systematic" contact exists between the nonresident and the
37 Id. at 297.
38 Id. (quoting Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235,253 (1958)). The Court reasoned
that once a defendant has purposefully availed itself of such a privilege, "it has clear
notice that it is subject to suit there, and can act to alleviate the risk of burdensome
litigation by procuring insurance, passing the expected costs on to customers, or, if
the risks are too great, severing its connection with the State." Id.31 See id. at 292. In a subsequent case, Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S.
462 (1985), the Court pointed out that a defendant need not "physically enter" the
forum state in order to be subject to suit there. Id. at 476. Instead, if a party
"purposefully direct[s]" its efforts towards residents of another state, it will be subject
to that state's jurisdiction provided that sufficient minimum contacts exist. Id.
(quoting Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, 465 U.S. 770, 774 (1984)). In Burger King, the
Court ruled that the defendant, a franchisee of the Burger King restaurant chain, was
subject tojurisdiction in Florida in light of having "entered into a carefully structured
20-year relationship that envisioned continuing and wide-reaching contacts with
Burger King in Florida." Id. at 480.
40 466 U.S. 408, 414 nn.8-9 (1984).
41 Id. at 414 (citations omitted).
42 Id. (quoting Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 204 (1977)). An example of such
a relationship would be the commission of an allegedly tortious act by a nonresident
defendant in the forum state. "Specific"jurisdiction would only exist over claims that
arose from or were related to that tortious act.
4" For example, corporations are subject to general jurisdiction in their states of
incorporation. See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
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forum state.
44
Finally, the Court has recently recognized that there may be
instances in which jurisdiction would not comport with due process
even when minimum contacts have been established between the
defendant and the forum state. In Asahi Metal Industy Co. v.
Superior Court,4 5 plaintiff Zurcher had brought a products liability
suit against a Taiwanese tire manufacturer ("Cheng Shin").
4 6
Cheng Shin, in turn, filed a cross-complaint against a Japanese tire
valve manufacturer ("Asahi"). 4 7 Zurcher's claims against Cheng
Shin were eventually settled out of court, but Cheng Shin's claim
against Asahi remained.4 8
Writing for the Court, Justice O'Connor emphasized that the
only claim remaining before the California courts was Cheng Shin's
indemnification claim against Asahi.49 Furthermore, the transac-
tion involved in that claim-Asahi's sale of tire valves to Cheng
Shin-had taken place in Taiwan and had very little to do with the
State of California (except that the tires which had caused Zurcher's
injury had eventually ended up there).50 California's interests in
adjudicating the dispute were deemed slight compared to the
burden on Asahi to litigate this particular claim in a foreign
country.5 1 O'Connor also noted that "[t]he unique burdens placed
upon one who must defend oneself in a foreign legal system should
have significant weight in assessing the reasonableness of stretching
44 Helicopteros, 466 U.S. at 415. Helicopteros involved a wrongful death action
stemming from a helicopter crash in South America in which four Americans were
killed. See id. at 410. The plaintiffs instituted the action in Texas against a number
of defendants, including Helicol, a Colombian corporation. See id. at 412. Helicol
was the owner of the helicopters at the time and had entered into a contract in Peru
to provide the helicopters for transportation purposes in South America. See id. at
410. Helicol's only contacts with Texas consisted of sending an executive officer
there for contract negotiations, accepting checks drawn on a Houston bank,
purchasing helicopters from a Texas company, and sending personnel to helicopter
training facilities in Fort Worth. See id. at 416. All of the parties agreed that the
claims against Helicol did not "arise out of" Helicol's activities in Texas, and therefore
specific jurisdiction was absent. Id. at 415. The Court held that Helicol's contacts
with Texas were not ofa "continuous and systematic" nature and therefore would not
justify Texas's exercise of general jurisdiction over Helicol. Id. at 416.
45 480 U.S. 102 (1987).
46 See id. at 106.
47 See id.
48 See id.
49 See id. at 114.
50 See id.
51 See id.
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the long arm of personal jurisdiction over national borders."
52
Under these circumstances, O'Connor concluded that California's
exercise of jurisdiction over Asahi would be "unreasonable and
unfair."
5 3
While the Court was unanimous in holding that jurisdiction over
Asahi was unconstitutional, the Court was divided on the question
of whether Asahi had, in fact, established minimum contacts with
California. Justice O'Connor was joined by three Justices in
concluding that minimum contacts had not been established.
54
Four Justices maintained that Asahi had established minimum
contacts by placing allegedly defective tire valves into the stream of
commerce with the expectation and/or knowledge that some of the
valves would end up in California.55 These Justices concluded that
California's exercise of jurisdiction would be unreasonable and
unfair (and therefore unconstitutional) despite the existence of
minimum contacts between Asahi and California.56 Justice Stevens
found it unnecessary to determine whether minimum contacts were
present, arguing that this was an instance in which jurisdiction over
Asahi would be unconstitutional regardless of whether such contacts
existed.5 7 Thus, five Justices agreed that in cases such as this one,
a forum's exercise ofjurisdiction over a litigant might not comport
with due process despite the existence of minimum contacts
between that litigant and the forum.
C. The Continuing Validity of the Cannon Doctrine in Light
of Erie and the International Shoe Minimum Contacts Test
As mentioned previously, many commentators have argued that
the Cannon doctrine is no longer valid both because it must now be
subordinated to state common law in light of Erie, and because it
has been superseded by the International Shoe minimum contacts
test.58 In addition to being called into question by subsequent
Supreme Court decisions, Cannon has been further undermined by
many lower court decisions which have held that it is no longer valid
in their jurisdictions.
59
52 Id.
53 Id. at 116.
54 See id. at 112-13.
55 See id. at 116 (Brennan,J., concurring in part and concurring in thejudgment).
5 See id.
57 See id. at 121 (Stevens,J, concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
8 See supra notes 20-21 and accompanying text.
59 For example, in Brunswick Corp. v. Suzuki Motor Co., 575 F. Supp. 1412 (E.D.
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Despite its many criticisms and apparent disavowals, a strong
argument can be made that the Cannon doctrine still does and
should constitute good law. One commentator has suggested that
the Court in Cannon may have been asserting a sort of "natural law"
of corporations under which formally separate corporations should
be treated as separate for jurisdictional purposes. 6° One sign that
the Cannon doctrine is still valid is that the Supreme Court has
never repudiated it despite having had occasion to do so. 6 1 In
Wis. 1983), the court ruled that Cannon was no longer relevant to the constitutional
inquiry into whether jurisdiction comported with due process. See id. at 1419. In
Brunswick, plaintiff Brunswick Corporation brought a patent infringement suit in
Wisconsin against, among others, Hitachi Ltd. ("Hitachi"), ajapanese corporation,
and Mitsubishi Electric Corporation ("MELCO"), also ajapanese corporation. See id.
at 1415. Neither Hitachi nor MELCO had ever directly conducted business in
Wisconsin, although both corporations sold products in Wisconsin through wholly
owned subsidiaries. See id. at 1415-16. In rejecting the continuing validity of Cannon,
the court stated that "the constitutional analysis under International Shoe permits
consideration of a non-resident's contacts with the forum state through its wholly
owned subsidiaries without regard to whether the affiliated corporations have
maintained a formal separation of corporate identities." Id. at 1419. Under this
standard, the court ruled that it could constitutionally exercise jurisdiction over
MELCO and Hitachi because the Japanese corporations had "avail[ed] themselves of
the benefits and protections of [Wisconsin]" by selling products there through their
wholly owned subsidiaries. Id. at 1422-23.
Similarly, in Gallagher v. Mazda Motor of Am., Inc., 781 F. Supp. 1079 (E.D. Pa.
1992), the court rejected the Cannon doctrine in favor of another approach. Under
Gallagher, "if a parent uses a subsidiary to do what it otherwise would have done
itself, it has purposely availed itself of the privilege of doing business in the forum
[and j]urisdiction ... is therefore proper." Id. at 1085. Thus, an analysis of the
nature of the parent subsidiary relationship, which is required under Cannon, is
completely unnecessary under Gallagher.
Some state courts have also apparently rejected the Cannon doctrine. See e.g.,
Empire Steel Corp. v. Superior Court, 366 P.2d 502, 506 (Cal. 1961) (pointing out
that "Cannon was not decided on the basis of the due process limitation on assertion
of jurisdiction by a court").
60 See Lea Brilmayer & Kathleen Paisley, PersonalJurisdiction and Substantive Legal
Relations: Corporations, Conspiracies, and Agency, 74 CAL. L. REV. 1, 3 (1986).
61 Some commentators have argued that the Court took a step toward repudiating
the Cannon doctrine in United States v. Scophony Corp. of America, 333 U.S. 795
(1948). Scophony involved a special venue statute under the Clayton Act through
which service of process was effected by serving the American subsidiary of a British
parent corporation. See id. at 796 & n.1. The Court ruled that the service was valid
under § 12 of the Clayton Act and distinguished the case from Cannon in that this
case was not a "manufacturing or selling" case. Id. at 816. Although the court did
appear to retreat from Cannon, it did so only in the context of antitrust actions
stating that it was "unwilling to construe § 12 in a manner to bring back the evils it
abolished." Id. at 817. Thus, it is not altogether clear what weight should be given
to Scophony in cases not involving antitrust actions. See Akzona Inc. v. E.I. Du Pont
de Nemours & Co., 607 F. Supp. 227, 239 (D. Del. 1984) (arguing that Scophony is
distinguishable from Cannon in that it applies a more lenientjurisdictional standard
338 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 141:327
fact, the Court may have implicitly recognized the doctrine's
continuing validity in Keeton v. Hustler Magazine.62 In a footnote
of Keeton, Chief Justice Rehnquist noted that "jurisdiction over a
parent corporation [does not] automatically establish jurisdiction
over a wholly owned subsidiary.... Each defendant's contacts with
the forum State must be assessed individually." 63 The clear
implication of Rehnquist's assertion is that the nature of the parent-
subsidiary relationship may well be a factor in determining whether
jurisdiction comports with due process, but the existence of the
relationship will not, in and of itself, be dispositive of the issue.
The strongest indication that Cannon retains vitality is that it is
cited as both valid and current legal doctrine in a significant
number of both state and federal court opinions. In Esude Cruz v.
Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp.,6 4 for example, the plaintiff alleged that
Ortho Pharmaceutical Corporation ("OPC"), a NewJersey corpora-
tion, and its wholly owned subsidiary, Ortho Pharmaceuticals, Inc.
("OPI"), a Puerto Rican corporation, were responsible for work-
related injuries the plaintiff suffered while working at OPI in Puerto
Rico. 65 The Puerto Rican Workmen's Compensation Act immuniz-
es employers against claims arising from work-related injuries,
however, so the plaintiff's only hope of obtaining recovery was to
file suit against OPC.66 In affirming the lower court's dismissal of
the suit against OPC for lack of jurisdiction, the court adhered to
the Cannon doctrine, pointing out that "[t]he mere fact that a
subsidiary company does business within a state does not confer
jurisdiction over its nonresident parent, even if the parent is sole
owner of the subsidiary." 67  The court further noted that the
presumption of corporate separateness must be overcome by
evidence that the parent in fact controls the activities of the
subsidiary, and no such evidence had been presented.68
only to § 12 of the Clayton Act).
62 465 U.S. 770 (1984).
63 Id. at 781 n.13 (citations omitted).
64 619 F.2d 902 (1st Cir. 1980).
65 See id. at 903-04.
66 See id. at 904.67 Id. at 905 (citing Cannon Mfg. Co. v. Cudahy Packing Co., 267 U.S. 333, 336
(1925)).
68 See id. Similarly, in Bielicki v. Empire Stevedoring Co., 741 F. Supp. 758 (D.
Minn. 1990), plaintiffs sued defendant Empire Stevedoring Company ("Empire
Canada"), a Canadian corporation, in Minnesota claiming that Minnesota courts could
exertjurisdiction over Empire Canada based on the incorporation of its wholly owned
subsidiary, Empire Stevedoring, Inc. ("Empire Duluth") in Minnesota. See id. at 760.
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Most courts that still adhere to the Cannon doctrine do not
employ a purely "formalistic" approach in determining whether
corporate separation between the parent and subsidiary exists.
Instead, courts tend to scrutinize the nature of the parent-subsidiary
relationship to determine whether the parent and subsidiary should,
in fact, be treated as separate entities.
69
In addition to the lower court decisions which still explicitly
recognize Cannon, there are some decisions which appear to reject
the Cannon doctrine but are actually consistent with it. In Coca-Cola
Co. v. Procter & Gamble Co., for example, Coca-Cola sued Procter &
Gamble in Georgia for tortious interference with a contract.
70
Although Procter & Gamble did not conduct business in Georgia,
many of its subsidiaries did. The court held that Georgia could
exercise personal jurisdiction over Procter & Gamble based on its
"pervasive and tight control" over subsidiaries that conducted
business in Georgia.71 In so holding, the court seemed to reject
the Cannon doctrine when it ruled that the "harsh strictures" of the
Cannon doctrine were no longer applicable because the holding of
Cannon had been "substantially refined" by International Shoe and its
progeny.72 Despite this apparent disavowal of Cannon, the court's
decision in Coca-Cola is not inconsistent with the Cannon doctrine.
The Cannon doctrine simply states thatjurisdiction over a subsidiary
The court began its analysis by adopting the Cannon doctrine, stating that "[a]
corporation is not doing business in a state merely by the presence of its wholly
owned subsidiary." Id. at 761. In this case, however, the court held that the exercise
of jurisdiction over Empire Canada would comport with due process because
plaintiffs had set forth sufficient evidence that Empire Canada exercised enough
control over Empire Duluth for the court to "disregard the corporate identity of
Empire Duluth." Id. at 762. In other words, the corporate separation between
Empire Canada and Empire Duluth was analogous to the "pure fiction" Justice
Brandeis alluded to in Cannon. Cannon, 267 U.S. at 337. The court ultimately held
that the exercise ofjurisdiction was invalid, however, because the Minnesota long-arm
statute authorized specificjurisdiction but not generaljurisdiction, and plaintiffs had
not shown any specific connection between the acts complained of and Empire
Canada's business activities in Minnesota. See Bielicki, 741 F. Supp. at 764; see also
Graco, Inc. v. Kremlin, Inc., 558 F. Supp. 188, 190 (N.D. Ill. 1982) (citing Cannon for
the proposition that the mere existence of a parent-subsidiary relationship is not
sufficient to make the parent amenable to suit in ajurisdiction where the subsidiary
is located); Idaho Potato Comm'n v. Washington Potato Comm'n, 410 F. Supp. 171,
179 (D. Idaho 1976) (same), Botwinick v. Credit Exch. Co., 213 A.2d 349, 353 (Pa.
1965) (adopting Cannon).
69 See infra notes 75-84 and accompanying text.
70 595 F. Supp. 304, 306 (N.D. Ga. 1983).
71 Id. at 308.
7 Id. at 307-08.
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will not automatically establish jurisdiction over the parent corpora-
tion when "formal" and "real" separation between the parent and
subsidiary is maintained. In Coca Cola, the court's decision that
jurisdiction over Procter & Gamble comported with due process was
reached only after a lengthy analysis of the relationship between
Procter & Gamble and its subsidiaries. This analysis revealed that
the subsidiaries were "equivalent to departments or divisions of
[Procter & Gamble]. " 73 The ruling that jurisdiction was proper
was therefore consistent with the Cannon doctrine since the court
found that formal separation between the parent and subsidiaries
had not been maintained.74
Thus, many state and federal courts adhere (either explicitly or
implicitly) to the principles first embodied in Cannon when making
jurisdictional determinations in cases involving parent and subsid-
iary corporations. 75 The tests which these courts use to evaluate
parent-subsidiary relationships forjurisdictional purposes often vary
in their terminology, but the tests are actually very similar. In New
York, for example, courts exercise jurisdiction over foreign parent
corporations if their subsidiaries are the "agents" or "mere
departments" of their corporate parents (assuming the subsidiaries
are subject to jurisdiction in New York). 76 Courts in other states
exercise jurisdiction over nonresident parent corporations by virtue
of the actions of their subsidiaries when the subsidiaries are the
"alter-egos" or "instrumentalities" of the parent corporations.
77
The Delaware District Court's decision in Akzona Inc. v. E.I. Du
Pont de Nemours & Co. 78 evidences the similarity between agents,
instrumentalities and alter-egos. In defining these terms, the Akzona
73 Id. at 308.
74 Cannon's standard for determining whether corporate separation between a
parent and subsidiary exists may have been too formalistic for the court in Coca-Cola
(although an actual standard for making such a determination was not really
established in Cannon). Still, as mentioned at infra notes 75-84 and accompanying
text, courts may scrutinize the existence of corporate separation between a parent and
subsidiary more closely than Brandeis did in Cannon without being inconsistent with
the Cannon doctrine. A court's decision will be consistent with the Cannon doctrine
so long as the ultimate jurisdictional determination hinges on the existence (or lack)
of corporate separation between the parent and subsidiary, regardless of whether a
formalistic standard is used in making that determination.
75 See, e.g., BLUMBERG, supra note 19, § 3.05 (pointing out that most federal courts
still adhere to Cannon); see also supra notes 60-74 and accompanying text.76 See BLUMBERG, supra note 19, §§ 4.01-.06 (discussing New York jurisdictional
law in the context of parent-subsidiary relationships).
77 See id. §§ 5.03-.10 (discussing the jurisdictional standards of various states).
7' 607 F. Supp. 227 (D. Del. 1984).
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court stated that "[i]n order to find that a subsidiary is the alter ego
or instrumentality of the parent, the plaintiff must prove: 'control
by the parent to such a degree that the subsidiary has become its
mere instrumentality.'" 79 Similarly, a finding that a subsidiary is
a parent's agent involves "a determination that the separate
corporate identities of the subsidiary and parent are a fiction and
that the subsidiary is, in fact, being operated as a department of the
parent. The parent must have actual, participatory and total control
of the subsidiary."
80
As Akzona makes clear, the main factor in deciding whether a
subsidiary is a parent's agent, instrumentality, or alter-ego is the
extent to which the parent exercises control over the subsidiary. In
this sense, the jurisdictional analysis of a parent-subsidiary relation-
ship parallels the corporate-veil-piercing analysis used to determine
a parent's substantive liability for the actions of its subsidiary.
81
Other factors relevant to the determination of whether to pierce the
corporate veil for both jurisdictional and substantive liability
purposes include the extent to which the parent finances the
subsidiary, whether the parent owns all of the subsidiary's stock,
whether the parent caused the incorporation of the subsidiary,
whether the parent and subsidiary have common officers and
directors, and whether the subsidiary is undercapitalized. 2
If, after going through this analysis, a court determines that a
parent and subsidiary are legitimately separate corporate entities,
contacts with the forum aside from the ownership of a subsidiary
79 Id. at 237 (quoting Steven v. Roscoe Turner Aeronautical Corp., 324 F.2d 157,
160 (7th Cir. 1963)).
o Id. (citations omitted). For a more complete discussion of the methods courts
use in determining whether a subsidiary's actions should be attributed to those of the
parent corporation, see Brilmayer & Paisley, supra note 60, at 15-39.
81 See 1 FLETCHER, supra note 2, § 43.70 (perm. ed. rev. vol. 1990) (discussing
instances in which courts will ignore the separation between the parent and subsidiary
forjurisdictional purposes); Knudsen, supra note 20, at 919. Although courts employ
similar analyses in the context ofjurisdiction as they do in the context of substantive
liability, the standards for acquiringjurisdiction are not as strict as the applicable tests
in liability cases in that fraud or wrongdoing are not required elements for a finding
ofjurisdiction over the absent corporation. See 1 FLETCHER, supra note 2, § 43.70
(perm. ed. rev. vol. 1990); see abo 18A FLETCHER, supra note 2, § 8773 (perm. ed. rev.
vol. 1988) (discussing factors relevant to the determination of whether a parent and
subsidiary should be considered separate entities for the purpose of serving process
on foreign parent corporations).
82 See Bielicki v. Empire Stevedoring Co., 741 F. Supp. 759, 761-62 (D. Minn.
1990); see also 1 FLETCHER, supra note 2, §§ 41, 41.10 (perm. ed. rev. vol. 1990)
(discussing similar factors used to determine whether the corporate veil should be
pierced for purposes of substantive liability).
1992]
342 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 141:327
will generally be necessary in order to subject the parent to the
forum's jurisdiction. s3 In this sense, the law appears to integrate
aspects of the Cannon doctrine into the minimum contacts analysis:
although a parent's ownership of a subsidiary incorporated or
conducting business in the forum state constitutes a contact with the
forum state, a more lengthy veil-piercing analysis is necessary before
it can be determined whether this contact alone suffices under the
International Shoe minimum contacts test.
84
D. The Justification for Continued Adherence to Cannon
The continued adherence to Cannon is fully justifiable because
the Cannon doctrine is based on sound legal and economic
principles. One of the deeply rooted principles of the law of
corporations is that stockholders of a corporation are not to be held
personally responsible for the liabilities of a corporation.8 5 This
83 For example, in Ryder Truck Rental v. Acton Foodservices Corp., 554 F. Supp.
277 (C.D. Cal. 1983), plaintiff brought a breach of contract action against defendant
Acton Foodservices and its corporate grandparent, Beltran; a Delaware corporation,
in California. See id. at 278. Beltran had no contacts with California other than its
indirect ownership of Acton. The court granted Beltran's motion to dismiss for lack
ofjurisdiction because no showing had been made that Beltran and Acton were not
legitimately separate corporate entities. See id. at 279. The court noted that "[s]ole
ownership of the subsidiary by the parent is not enough; in addition, there must be
'clear evidence that the parent in fact controls the activities of the subsidiary.'" Id.
(quoting Escude Cruz v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 619 F.2d 902, 905 (1st Cir.
1980)); see also Williams v. Canadian Fishing Co., 509 P.2d 64, 67 (Wash. App. 1973)
(holding that ownership of a subsidiary was not itself sufficient to establish
jurisdiction); 18A FLETCHER, supra note 2, § 8773 (perm. ed. rev. vol. 1988) ("[M]ere
stock ownership by the parent of the subsidiary is not sufficient in and of itself to
charge the parent company with responsibility for the acts of the subsidiary, and such
ownership does not constitute the requisite 'minimum contact' necessary to establish
jurisdiction over the parent company.").
84 In this sense, the law is consistent with then-Justice Rehnquist's reasoning in
Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, 465 U.S. 770 (1984). See supra notes 62-63 and
accompanying text. Some courts argue that the inquiry into whether a subsidiary is
an agent, alter-ego, or instrumentality is different from the jurisdictional test of
Cannon because Cannon's approach was concerned only with "corporate form." See
Gallagher v. Mazda Motor of Am., Inc., 781 F. Supp. 1079, 1083-84 (E.D. Pa. 1992).
As mentioned previously, it is debatable whether Cannon requires a purely formalistic
approach. Even if such an approach were required at one time, most courts which
presently adhere to Cannon do not employ an overly formalistic approach. See supra
notes 19, 75-84 and accompanying text. Thus, the distinction between the test
involved in determining whether the subsidiary is an agent, alter-ego, or instrumental-
ity of a parent and the approach espoused by modern applications of Cannon is, at
most, minimal.
85 See 13A FLETCHER, supra note 2, §§ 6213-6214 (perm. ed. rev. vol. 1984)
(outlining the general rule that stockholders are not liable for the debts or acts of
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general principle is also applicable to parent and subsidiary
corporations: a parent corporation's mere ownership of all or part
of the stock of a subsidiary corporation does not make the parent
liable for the debts or actions of the subsidiary.
8 6
Just as there are many economic reasons for limiting the liability
of shareholders of corporations,8 7 there are sound reasons for
limiting a parent corporation's liability for the debts and actions of
its subsidiary. If the liability of related corporations (such as
parents and subsidiaries) were not limited, unrelated corporations
would be able to obtain competitive advantages over related
corporations. For example, taxi cab corporations that own many
taxi cabs often incorporate each cab separately (as a subsidiary) in
order to limit any liability from accidents to the particular cab
involved in the accident. If the individual cabs of a larger company
could not be incorporated separately in such a manner, "true" single
cab firms would have a significant competitive advantage in terms
of lower operation costs: the liability of the "true" single company
would be limited to its few assets (i.e., the single cab), while the
larger multi-cab company could be liable to the extent of the full
value of all of its assets, including the other cabs not involved in the
accident. This competitive advantage for unrelated corporations
would result in inefficiencies because the advantages of economies
of scale derived from forming larger corporations would be
foregone.
88
The most notable exception to the general rule of non-liability
of a parent corporation is the situation in which the corporate
separation between the parent and subsidiary is not legitimately
maintained, or is, as Justice Brandeis wrote in Cannon, "pure
fiction."89 When corporate separation is not legitimately main-
tained, the "corporate veil" will be pierced and the parent corpora-
tion will be held substantively liable for the debts or acts of its
subsidiaries. 9° The piercing of the corporate veil protects credi-
corporations in which they own shares).
s6 See id. § 6222.
87 See e.g., Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Limited Liability and the
Corporation, 52 U. Cm. L. REV. 89, 93-98 (1985) (discussing the economic rationale
for limiting the liability of shareholders).
8 See id. at 111.
89 See Cannon Mfg. Co. v. Cudahy Packing Co., 267 U.S. 333, 337 (1925); 13A
FLETcHER, supra note 2, § 6222 (perm. ed. rev. vol. 1984).
'o Seesupra notes 75-84 and accompanying text for a discussion of relevant factors
in determining when the corporate veil should be pierced forjurisdictional purposes.
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tors of the subsidiary and ensures that managers of the parent
corporation do not engage in a "socially excessive amount of risky
activities."
9 1
Cannon simply applies this principle of limited liability to cases
in which the issue is whether jurisdiction should be exercised over
the parent corporation based on the actions of its subsidiary. If a
parent and subsidiary are legitimately separate corporate entities,
then the parent will not be liable for the actions of its subsidiary.
If a parent must nevertheless litigate claims stemming from the
actions of its subsidiary in a forum where it would not otherwise be
subject to jurisdiction, the parent corporation will be exposed to the
burdens associated with having to litigate in a forum with which it
has negligible contacts, even if the final outcome is the exoneration
of the parent corporation. These burdens include increased
litigation costs92 and the possibility that the forum's laws may be
unfavorable to the corporation. In addition, the parent corpora-
tion's officers and directors may have to divert much of their
attention away from more productive matters to the litigation. The
imposition of such burdens on the parent corporation runs counter
to the very purpose of limiting the liability of the parent corpora-
tion in the first place and therefore arguably offends traditional
notions of fair play and substantial justice. Thus, the integration of
the Cannon doctrine (and the general principles of limited corporate
liability) into the International Shoe test is both legally and economi-
cally justifiable.
II. JURISDICTION OVER A PARENT CORPORATION IN
ITS SUBSIDIARY'S STATE OF INCORPORATION
The preceding analysis provides a general framework for
determining when a court can appropriately exercise jurisdiction
over a parent corporation based on the actions of its subsidiary.
Litigation in this context arises very often in the subsidiary's
91 Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 87, at 111.
92 A corporation that is forced to litigate in a forum with which it has virtually no
contacts is likely to incur litigation costs above those that would be incurred in a
forum with which the corporation has many contacts. These additional costs include,
but are not limited to, attorney's fees for local counsel, paying travel expenses for
executives and/or witnesses and the general costs associated with becoming familiar
with the laws of a particular forum. These added costs are likely to have the most
significant impact on foreign corporations (especially those that are not otherwise
amenable to suit in the United States) and on small to medium-sized domestic
corporations.
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principal place of business or in a forum where a subsidiary does
substantial business. Part II, however, will deal only with the
specific issue of when a parent will be subject to jurisdiction in its
subsidiary's state of incorporation. An important factor to keep in
mind throughout this discussion is that corporations often have
virtually no relationship with their states of incorporation (unlike
with their principal states of business). Delaware, for example, is
the state of incorporation of a significant number of the United
States' largest corporations, but most of those corporations do very
little, if any, business in Delaware, and very few of them actually
have their principal places of business in Delaware. Given that a
subsidiary may have virtually no relationship to its state of incorpo-
ration, a nonresident parent corporation is likely to have even less
of a connection to its subsidiary's state of incorporation. Very
often, the parent's only relationship to that state will be that it once
filed documents necessary to incorporate its subsidiary there.
This part begins by summarizing the constitutional issues
specifically applicable to a determination of whether a parent can
be subjected to jurisdiction in its subsidiary's state of incorporation.
This summary is followed by an analysis of recent Delaware
decisions in which nonresident parent corporations of Delaware
subsidiaries have been subjected to the jurisdiction of the Delaware
courts.
A. The Constitutional Appropriateness of Exercising Jurisdiction Over
a Nonresident Parent Corporation in its Subsidiaiy's
State of Incorporation
Even though the Supreme Court has never directly addressed
the issue of when jurisdiction over a parent corporation in the
subsidiary's state of incorporation is appropriate, the decisions in
Cannon and International Shoe and its progeny lay out the basic
framework necessary to make such a determination. If only the
Cannon doctrine were applied, a parent corporation would not be
subject to jurisdiction in the state of incorporation of its subsidiary
(absent any other contacts with the state) so long as formal
separation between the parent and subsidiary existed. On the other
hand, if the subsidiary were the agent, alter-ego, or instrumentality
of the parent, the separation would be more analogous to the "pure
fiction" mentioned by Justice Brandeis in Cannon, and jurisdiction
over the parent corporation would be valid under the Cannon
doctrine.
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The constitutional issue is not so simple in light of International
Shoe and its progeny, especially under the hypothetical assumption
that International Shoe has rendered the Cannon doctrine obsolete.
To the extent that Shaffer holds that ownership of property in the
forum state is not itself sufficient to justify jurisdiction over a
nonresident property owner, the mere ownership of the stock of a
subsidiary should not subject a nonresident parent to the forum's
jurisdiction.
9 3
Shaffer implies more, however: if the cause of action is related
to the property, then jurisdiction may be valid. In this sense, the
argument can be made that a suit alleging wrongdoing on the part
of a subsidiary is related to a nonresident parent corporation's
property (i.e., its ownership of the subsidiary's stock). There is
reason to think that the Shaffer Court would have rejected this
argument. The types of claims to which the Shaffer Court was
probably referring differ from those which would most likely arise
in the parent-subsidiary context. For example, the Court would
likely have upheld jurisdiction if the controversy involved claims to
the property itself.9 4 Yet this type of claim would not arise in the
parent-subsidiary context unless the ownership of the subsidiary's
stock itself were at issue.
The Court also stated that jurisdiction might be appropriate for
claims where the cause of action is related to "rights and duties"
growing out of the ownership of the property such as suits for injury
suffered on the land of a nonresident owner.9 5 However, in
Shaffer, the Court's decision invalidating jurisdiction over the
nonresident directors did not hinge on the fact that the nonresident
directors only owned a small percentage of Greyhound stock.
Instead, the court ruled that there was simply no relationship
between the directors' duties as directors (at issue in the suit) and
their ownership of some of Greyhound's stock. 6 Nothing in
Shaffer implies that the Court would have reached a different result
had the nonresident directors owned large percentages of Grey-
hound stock. Thus, after Shaffer, the question pertinent to a
13 See, e.g., Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 216 (1977) ("'Vlit strains reason...
to suggest that anyone buying securities in a corporation formed in Delaware
"impliedly consents" to subject himself to Delaware's.. .jurisdiction on any cause of
action.'") (quoting Ernest L. Folk III & Peter F. Moyer, Sequestration in Delaware: A
Constitutional Analysis, 73 COLUM. L. REv. 749, 785 (1973)).
94 See Skaffer, 433 U.S. at 207.
95 Id. at 208.
96 See id. at 213.
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jurisdictional determination in the parent-subsidiary context is
whether ownership of a subsidiary's stock is unrelated to a cause of
action stemming from the acts of the subsidiary. A strong argument
can be made that because a parent and subsidiary are legally
separate entities and the law of corporations limits the liability of
stockholders, mere ownership of a subsidiary's stock bears no
relation to causes of action arising out of the acts of a subsidiary
when the corporate separation between the parent and subsidiary
is legitimately maintained. 7 Thus, just as directors' duties to their
corporations are unrelated to their ownership of stock, a parent's
ownership of a subsidiary's stock is arguably unrelated to the actions
of the subsidiary. Consequently, Shaffer ought not to allow
jurisdiction over a parent based solely on its ownership of the stock
of a subsidiary.
The standard enunciated in World-Wide Volkswagen also dictates
against exercising jurisdiction over a parent corporation based only
on its ownership of the stock of a subsidiary. After World-Wide
Volkswagen, the issues central to determining a parent corporation's
amenability to suit in its subsidiary's state of incorporation are:
(1) whether a parent "purposefully avails" itself of the privilege of
conducting activities in the forum state when it incorporates a
subsidiary there, and (2) whether a parent corporation can "reason-
ably anticipate" being haled into court in the state of incorporation
of its subsidiary.98 The proposition that the incorporation of a
subsidiary constitutes purposeful availment of the laws of the
subsidiary's state of incorporation has little merit. There is little
difference in principle between incorporating (or purchasing) a
subsidiary in a state and purchasing or building a house there. In
both cases there may be a benefit to utilizing the laws of the forum
state,9 but in neither case should a party be amenable to suit in
that state for causes of action unrelated to the ownership of the
property. Furthermore, in most cases, a parent that maintains
legitimate separation from its subsidiary will probably not "reason-
ably anticipate" being haled into court in the state of incorporation
of its subsidiary. After all, many jurisdictions have followed the
Cannon doctrine for 65 years by requiring more than a showing of
'7 This argument would be especially compelling if the Supreme Court were
explicitly to reaffirm the principles embodied in Cannon.
" World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297 (1980).
9 In building a house, there may be favorable building codes or tax advantages
in particular states, for example.
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ownership over a subsidiary in order for jurisdiction to be asserted
over a nonresident parent.
The nature of the relationship between the parent and subsid-
iary becomes important in the context of the Court's decision in
Helicopteros. If the separation between the parent and subsidiary is
fictitious, and they are, for practical purposes, the same entity, then
the parent is arguably subject to general jurisdiction wherever the
subsidiary is subject to general jurisdiction, including the subsid-
iary's state of incorporation. 1°° If corporate separation is legiti-
mately maintained, the parent would be subject to specific jurisdic-
tion in the subsidiary's state of incorporation only if the litigation
"arises" out of the parent's actions in that state, such as incorporat-
ing, purchasing, or even exercising control over some of the actions
of the subsidiary.
10 1
Finally, Asahi points out that there may be some instances in
which jurisdiction would not comport with due process even if
minimum contacts between a party and the forum exist.
10 2
Subjecting a parent to suit in the state of incorporation of its
subsidiary solely on the basis of its having incorporated that
subsidiary may well be one such instance in which jurisdiction would
be unconstitutional even the if the ownership of the stock of the
local subsidiary were considered a minimum contact. This inference
is supported by the corporate law principle favoring limited
shareholder liability, especially when shareholders do not exercise
complete control over the activities of the corporations in which
they own stock.1 03
The above analysis reveals that there are no constitutional
problems to subjecting a parent that incorporates a subsidiary as an
alter-ego, agent, or instrumentality to jurisdiction in the subsidiary's
state of incorporation. Such a result would be consistent with both
Cannon and the International Shoe minimum contacts cases. As
alluded to previously in Part I, a strong argument can be made that
Cannon has been integrated into the International Shoe minimum
100 Under such circumstances, the parent corporation would be considered to have
a "continuous and systematic" contact with the subsidiary's state of incorporation.
See Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 416 (1984).
'10 See id. at 414 n.8.
102 See supra notes 45 & 54-57 and accompanying text.
s Another implication of Asahi is that the burdens of litigating in a foreign
country should be given significant weight in a court's decision of whether to exercise
jurisdiction over a corporation organized under the laws of a foreign country. See
Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102, 114 (1987).
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contacts analysis, and rightly so.10 4 If this is the case, the force of
the Cannon doctrine should bear heavily on situations in which a
parent establishes a subsidiary that is a legitimately separate
corporate entity. In such instances, the parent's incorporation and
ownership of the subsidiary's stock may be relevant factors in
determining if minimum contacts with the subsidiary's state of
incorporation exist, but should not be treated as contacts sufficient
to satisfy the International Shoe test. Even if one were to reject the
proposition that Cannon has been integrated into International Shoe,
however, the International Shoe minimum contacts cases raise serious
doubts as to the constitutional validity of subjecting a nonresident
parent corporation to the jurisdiction of its subsidiary's state of
incorporation based solely on its ownership of that subsidiary's
stock.
B. Delaware's Expansive Exercise ofJurisdiction
Whether a parent corporation should be subject to the jurisdic-
tion of its subsidiary's state of incorporation is an issue not likely to
arise frequently before courts in much of the United States. In
many cases, both the parent and subsidiary are incorporated in the
same state, while in other cases suits are brought in the subsidiary's
principal place of business, a state often different from the
subsidiary's state of incorporation. Delaware, however, has a unique
tendency to attract a disproportionate number of corporations to
incorporate within its borders. Not surprisingly, the Delaware
courts have had ample opportunity to examine this issue at length.
The Delaware Supreme Court has construed the jurisdictional reach
of its courts very expansively and has, in most cases, held that
jurisdiction over the nonresident parent was proper. The Delaware
decisions are of great significance not only because so many
nonresident corporations choose to incorporate subsidiaries there,
but also because many other states look to Delaware corporate law
for guidance in developing their own corporate law.
The following four hypothetical situations illustrate possible
justifications for subjecting a nonresident parent of a Delaware
subsidiary to jurisdiction in Delaware: 1) the local subsidiary is the
alter-ego, agent, or instrumentality of the parent; 2) the cause of
action arises out of the very act of incorporating (or purchasing) the
subsidiary; 3) the parent, by incorporating (or purchasing) the
'04 See supra notes 60-92 and accompanying text.
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subsidiary, sets in motion a chain of events from which the cause of
action arises; or 4) the parent, by opting not to reincorporate the
subsidiary in another state, chooses to operate the subsidiary as a
Delaware corporation, thereby availing itself of the benefits of
Delaware law.
The first example merits little discussion. The corporate
separation between the parent and the subsidiary is essentially
fictitious when a subsidiary is a parent's alter-ego, agent, or
instrumentality, and the parent and subsidiary should be treated as
the same entity. Therefore, under both the Cannon doctrine and
the International Shoe minimum contacts test (as well as a test
integrating the two lines of cases), the parent can be regarded as
having the same contacts to the subsidiary's state of incorporation
as does the subsidiary. As a result, the exercise ofjurisdiction over
the parent in the subsidiary's state of incorporation comports with
both due process and principles of limiting corporate liability.
10 5
The situation is more complex, however, when corporate formalities
between the parent and subsidiary are, in fact, observed and the
actions of a subsidiary cannot be imputed to the parent. Assuming
that such formalities are observed and the parent and subsidiary are
legitimately separate entities, the latter three hypothetical situations
present constitutional questions which are discussed below.
1. Jurisdiction Over a Nonresident Parent When the Cause
of Action Arises Out of the Act of Incorporating or
Purchasing the Subsidiary
In Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Sears PLC 1° 6 ("Sears Ir' and "Sears
I1"), the court faced an instance in which the cause of action
allegedly arose from a foreign parent's act of incorporating a
subsidiary in Delaware. Plaintiff Sears, Roebuck sued Sears PLC
("PLC") for infringing its trade name (and trademark) by causing its
10 5 The implication of this result is that the parent would be subject to jurisdiction
in Delaware for causes of action completely unrelated to acts of the subsidiary. This
is not unjustified, however, since the subsidiary's Delaware citizenship could be
attributed to the parent by virtue of the lack of separation between the parent and
subsidiary.
106 744 F. Supp. 1297 (D. Del. 1990) [hereinafter Sears Hl]; 752 F. Supp. 1223 (D.
Del. 1990) [hereinafter Sears III]. Although Sears II and Sears III were decided in
different opinions, they both arose from the same litigation. See also Sears, Roebuck
& Co. v. Sears PLC, 744 F. Supp. 1289 (D. Del. 1990) [Sears ]. Sears I involved a
motion to dismiss by a British subsidiary of a British parent corporation and is
therefore inapplicable to the issues addressed in this Comment. See id. at 1291.
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subsidiaries to use the name "Sears." Originally, PLC had incorpo-
rated "Sears, Inc." in Delaware, intending that it be a holding
company of other American subsidiaries (owned directly or
indirectly by PLC).10 7  Sears, Roebuck immediately brought a
claim against Sears, Inc. for alleged trade name infringement.
Sears, Inc. agreed to change its name to Delaware Mercantile
Holdings, Inc. ("DMH") as part of a settlement in this phase of the
litigation.1 8 Although this portion of the dispute was never fully
litigated, it seems obvious that, for this claim at least, the cause of
action arose from PLC's very act of incorporating Sears, Inc.
DMH's former use of the name Sears, Inc., after all, stemmed from
PLC's act of incorporating DMH in Delaware.1° Thus, had the
court been faced with a complaint against PLC in this specific
portion of the litigation, it would have been completely justified in
exercising jurisdiction over PLC because "by incorporating a
subsidiary in Delaware... PLC performed an act in state sufficient
to confer personal jurisdiction over it for causes of action related to
that act of incorporation."
110
The court's decision was not limited to a ruling on trade name
infringement claims against DMH. Those claims were apparently
settled out of court.11 Sears, Roebuck's complaint against PLC
alleged that PLC caused both its Delaware and non-Delaware
subsidiaries to use the name "Sears" in violation of Sears, Roebuck's
trade name. PLC's motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction over
these claims was granted in part and denied in part. The claims
against PLC for the trade name infringements of its Delaware
subsidiaries were not dismissed, 112 while the claims against PLC
10 7 See Sears II, 744 F. Supp. at 1299.
108 See id.
109 At this juncture, it should be noted that a majority of states, including
Delaware, authorize one or more persons, including corporations, to act as
"incorporators" ofbusiness corporations. See IA FLETCHER, supra note 2, § 85 (perm.
ed. rev. vol. 1983). The fact that a parent corporation can incorporate a subsidiary
itself is important for jurisdictional purposes because if the subsidiary had been
incorporated by individuals not acting as agents of Sears PLC then Sears PLC could
not be said to have "incorporated" the subsidiary and therefore may not have
performed the "act of incorporation" in Delaware.
110 Sears II, 744 F. Supp. at 1303.
III See Sears II, 744 F. Supp. at 1299 (stating that Sears, Roebuck's complaint
against DMH was dismissed without admission of liability and with prejudice when
DMH agreed, as part of the settlement, that neither it nor any of its subsidiaries
would use the name "Sears").
112 See id. at 1303 (upholding jurisdiction over PLC for claims involving DMH);
see also Sears III, 752 F. Supp. at 1230 n.11 (upholding jurisdiction over PLC for
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for the actions of its non-Delaware subsidiaries were dismissed.
113
Although the court in Sears II seemed to rely primarily on its theory
that jurisdiction over PLC for the actions of its Delaware subsidiar-
ies was justified because of PLC's jurisdictional act of incorporating
DMH,114 a close reading of Sears II and the court's subsequent
decision in Sears III reveals that the court ultimately relied more
heavily on a different theory, namely a "limited agency theory."
115
Sears, Roebuck established that PLC sufficiently "directed and
controlled" its Delaware subsidiaries' use of the trade name Sears so
as to be subject to jurisdiction in Delaware. 116 Thus, it appears
that jurisdiction over PLC was not, in the end, based primarily on
PLC's having effected the incorporation of DMH (since whatever
claims involving a Delaware subsidiary other than DMH).
11s The court ruled that the exercise of specificjurisdiction over PLC for alleged
trade name infringements of PLC's non-Delaware subsidiaries "would run afoul of
due process" because none of those infringements arose out of PLC's contacts with
Delaware. Sears Ii, 752 F. Supp. at 1228.
114 This reliance on DMH's single jurisdictional act is somewhat curious.
Assuming that DMH was a separate corporate entity from PLC (a fact that was under
dispute), it could hardly be said that DMH's acts of trade name infringement, other
than its own previous use of the name Sears, were related to PLC's act of incorporat-
ing DMH. The court did not explain how the alleged trade name infringement by
Delaware subsidiaries other than DMH was specifically related to PLC's act of
incorporating DMH. In fact, it seems likely that the alleged infringement by these
subsidiaries was completely unrelated to the actual act of incorporating DMH.
"' In Sears II, the court analyzed the nature of the relationship between PLC and
DMH and found that a limited agency relationship existed: PLC "'directed and
controlled'" DMH in the accomplishment of infringing plaintiff's trade name. Sears
II, 744 F. Supp. at 1306 (quoting Altech Indus. Inc. v. Al Tech Specialty Steel, 542 F.
Supp. 53, 55 (D. Del. 1982)). In a footnote, the court noted that "specificjurisdiction
over PLC may also be predicated under this limited agency theory." Id. at 1306 n.7.
The Sears court relied on Altech as precedent for finding this agency relationship. In
Altech, plaintiff Altech Industries alleged trade name infringement against GATX and
its Delaware subsidiary Al Tech Specialty Steel ("Al Tech"). Al Tech became GATX's
subsidiary not because it was incorporated by GATX, but by virtue of GATX's
acquisition ofAl Tech's stock. The court noted that "[t]he mere acquisition by GATX
of all of the stock of defendant Al Tech violated no right of the plaintiff; standing
alone it gave rise to no cause of action. The wrong occurred when... GATX directed
and controlled the defendant Al Tech in infringing plaintiff's trade name." Altech, 542
F. Supp. at 55 (emphasis added). Similarly, it would seem that PLC's incorporation
of DMH, standing alone, did not give rise to the cause of action against PLC for trade
name infringement allegations against its subsidiaries, other than DMH's onetime use
of the name Sears, which was presumably settled out of court.
16 See Sears II1, 752 F. Supp. at 1224, 1230 n.11. It is not clear whether the Sears
court's "limited agency theory" constituted a finding that PLC's Delaware subsidiaries
were agents, alter-egos, or instrumentalities of PLC. Had such a finding clearly been
made, PLC would have arguably been subject to general jurisdiction in Delaware since
the Delaware citizenship of its subsidiaries could have been attributed to PLC.
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wrongs arose out of DMH's one-time use of the trade name "Sears,
Inc." were apparently dealt with in an out of court settlement
between DMH and Sears, Roebuck), but was based on the premise
that DMH and other subsidiaries were sufficiently controlled by PLC
so as to attribute their trade name infringements to PLC through a
limited agency relationship. 117 Still, the court never disavowed its
reliance in Sears H on PLC's act of incorporating DMH as one basis
for exercising jurisdiction over PLC for claims against subsidiaries
other than DMH.
Thus, the Sears cases are consistent with constitutional jurisdic-
tional standards to the extent they stand for the limited proposition
that when ajurisdictional act, such as incorporating a subsidiary, in
and of itself wrongfully harms a plaintiff, the parent corporation will
be subject to specific jurisdiction in the subsidiary's state of
incorporation. 118 This proposition is consistent with the specific
jurisdiction test of Helicopteros."9  It is conceivable that the
court's holding in the Sears cases could be construed more broadly
to include claims that do not arise from the specific act of incorpo-
rating a subsidiary (such as the alleged trade name infringements of
subsidiaries other than DMH). Such a broad construction of Sears
would raise constitutional concerns since it is difficult to conceive
how the tortious acts by subsidiaries other than DMH arose from or
were even remotely related to the specific act of incorporating
DMH. In such case, the Supreme Court's requirement in Helicop-
teros that the controversy be "related to" or "arise out of" the
defendant's contacts with the forum would appear not to have been
met.
120
n7 At least one judge has interpreted the court's holding in this manner. In
Applied Biosystems v. Cruachem, Ltd., 772 F. Supp. 1458 (D. Del. 1991),Judge Roth
relied on Sears III in determining that courts could consider the "acts by [an] agent
which were directed by the principal" to provide the basis for jurisdiction over the
principal. Id. at 1467 (citing Sears II, 752 F. Supp. at 1225).
118 Similarly, it follows that if the purchase of a subsidiary is wrongful, the parent
will be subject to claims arising therefrom in the state of incorporation of the
subsidiary.
119 In addition, this result is not inconsistent with Cannon because Cannon did not
involve facts where jurisdiction over the parent corporation could have been based
on specific acts committed by theparent corporation in the forum. See Cannon Mfg. Co.
v. Cudahy Packing Co., 267 U.S. 333 (1925).
120 This requirement would clearly be met if the Sears court's primary reliance
were on the limited agency theory, however, in which case the controversies would
arise out of PLC's contacts with its subsidiaries since the actions of the subsidiaries
could be attributed to PLC. Thus, a "'relationship among the defendant, the forum,
and the litigation'" would be properly established. See Helicopteros Nacionales de
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One way it could be argued that the Helicopteros tests for specific
or general jurisdiction had been satisfied, given the facts in Sears
(absent a finding of an agency, instrumentality, or alter-ego
relationship), would be to assert that the act of incorporating a
subsidiary "gave rise" to all subsequent wrongful acts committed by
the subsidiary. The act of incorporating the subsidiary in the first
place would, after all, be a "but for" cause of any subsequent acts
committed by the subsidiary. Whether this causal link suffices to
make the parent amenable to the forum's jurisdiction is discussed
in the following subsection.
12 1
Another argument is that the incorporation of a subsidiary
constitutes purposeful availment of the laws of the state of incorpo-
ration and thereby makes the incorporator amenable to suit for any
controversies arising out of the subsidiary's actions. This argument
is discussed below as well in,subsections three to five.
122
2. Jurisdiction Over the Nonresident Parent When the
Incorporation of the Subsidiary Sets in Motion a Chain
of Events Culminating in the Cause of Action
In 1975, Helmut Papendick contacted officials at Robert Bosch
GmbH ("Bosch"), a West German corporation, concerning a
company that Papendick felt would be a good acquisition candidate
for Bosch. 123 Papendick agreed to disclose the name of this
company to Bosch in consideration of a "finders fee." 124 Upon
receiving a "finders fee agreement" from Bosch, Papendick
disclosed the name of Borg-Warner Corporation ("Borg-Warner")
as the acquisition candidate. 125 A formal contract was subse-
quently signed between Bosch and Borg-Warner providing for the
purchase and receipt of two million shares of Borg-Warner's stock
by Bosch or an assignee. Just days prior to signing the contract with
Colombia v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408,414 (1984) (quoting Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186,
204 (1977)). Similarly, no constitutional problems would be presented if the Sears
court had unequivocally held that PLC's Delaware subsidiaries were the agents, alter-
egos, or instrumentalities of PLC, since jurisdiction could have been based on a
general jurisdiction theory under such a holding. See supra notes 43-44 and
accompanying text.
121 See infra notes 123-46 and accompanying text.
122 See infra notes 147-92 and accompanying text.
123 See Papendick v. Bosch, 410 A.2d 148, 149 (Del. 1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S.
909 (1980).
124 See id.
125 See id.
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Borg Warner, Bosch incorporated a subsidiary in Delaware, later
named Robert Bosch North America Incorporated ("RBNA"), to
serve as a "vehicle for the acquisition of the [Borg-Warner]
stock."126 Bosch designated RBNA as the recipient of the shares
of Borg-Warner stock purchased pursuant to the agreement. Bosch
subsequently refused to pay the finders fee to Papendick and
plaintiff filed an action against both Bosch and RBNA in Dela-
ware. 127 Bosch moved to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction claiming,
in part, that "'mere' ownership by [Bosch] of the stock of RBNA,
which does not do business in Delaware and is not the 'alter ego' of
[Bosch], is an insufficient contact upon which to assert jurisdic-
tion."
128
The Delaware Superior Court dismissed the action against Bosch
due to the similarities between this case and the United States
Supreme Court's decision in Shaffer.12 9 As in Shaffer, jurisdiction
over Bosch was allegedly obtained by serving RBNA's registered
agent in Delaware and attaching the stock Bosch owned in
RBNA.13 Furthermore, the contract between Bosch and plaintiff
from which the cause of action arose was not entered into in
Delaware and had nothing to do with the State of Delaware.
13 1
As in Shaffer, the Superior Court ruled that Bosch's ownership of
RBNA stock was insufficient to subject Bosch to jurisdiction in
Delaware:
[Bosch's stock ownership in RBNA] has no relevance to the
present litigation and the mere incorporation of a subsidiary
corporation in Delaware does not create a sufficient contact with
the State to expose [Bosch] to a situation which could amount to
in personam liability ....
To decide that incorporation is qualitatively sufficient is not
different from holding that the presence of the stock alone is
enough to meet constitutional standards for jurisdiction.
13 2
The Delaware Supreme Court rejected this argument and ruled
that jurisdiction over Bosch was appropriate.13 3 The court distin-
12 6 Id.
127 See id.
128 Id. at 150.
12 See Papendick v. Bosch, 389 A.2d 1315 (Del. Super. 1978), rev d, 410 A.2d 148
(Del. 1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 909 (1980).
130 See id. at 1316.
131 See id. at 1318.
13 2 Id. at 1318-19.
133 See Papendick v. Bosch, 410 A.2d 148 (Del. 1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 909
356 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 141:327
guished the case from Shaffer stating that there were significant
contacts between Bosch, the State of Delaware, and the litiga-
tion:
13
[Bosch] came into the State of Delaware to create, under the
Delaware Corporation Law, a subsidiary corporation for the
purpose of implementing its contract with [Borg-Warner] and
accomplishing its acquisition of [Borg-Warner] stock. [Bosch]
utilized the benefits and advantages of Delaware's Corporation
Law for the creation of RBNA to be the vehicle for channeling to
[Borg-Warner] the purchase money for the [Borg-Warner] stock
and for becoming the recipient of the [Borg-Warner] stock....
... [Bosch] purposefully availed itself of the benefits and
protections of the laws of the State of Delaware for financial gain
in activities related to the cause of action. Therein lies the
'minimum contact' sufficient to sustain the jurisdiction of
Delaware's courts over [Bosch].13 5
Thus, the court concluded that this was a case in which the cause of
action was related to Bosch's contacts with Delaware.13 6 The
court did not find it necessary to address the issue of whether
RBNA was the alter-ego, instrumentality, or agent of Bosch when it
acquired Borg-Warner's stock. Based on the facts of the case, it
seems relatively obvious that such a finding could have been made
and, as a result, jurisdiction over Bosch would clearly have been
(1980).
134 Here, the Delaware Supreme Court appears to be referring to the test for
specific jurisdiction enunciated in Helicopteros by the United States Supreme Court:
"When a controversy is related to or 'arises out of' a defendant's contacts with the
forum, the Court has said that a 'relationship among the defendant, the forum, and
the litigation' is the essential foundation of in personamjurisdiction." Helicopteros
Nacionales de Colombiav. Hall, 466 U.S. 408,414 (1984) (quotingShaffer v. Heitner,
433 U.S. 186, 204 (1977)). The Helicopteros test, therefore, is two-part. In addition
to a relationship between the forum, the litigation, and the defendant, the
controversy must arise from or be related to defendant's contacts to the forum. See id.
Thus, in order to satisfy the Helicopteros test, the Delaware Supreme Court should
have defined how plaintiff's claims arose from Bosch's sole contact with Delaware, its
incororation of RBNA.
3 Papendick, 410 A.2d at 152.1 6 Papendick's holding was followed in Rabkin v. Philip A. Hunt Chem. Corp., 547
A.2d 963, 966 (Del. Ch. 1986), where the court held that jurisdiction over a non-
residejnt parent corporation existed where the parent had incorporated a Delaware
subsidiary in order to effectuate a merger around which the lawsuit was centered.
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warranted.13 7  The court also accorded little weight to the fact
that the contract in dispute had not been entered into in Delaware
and was between a resident of Maryland and a West German
corporation. 
1 3 8
In reaching its decision thatjurisdiction over Bosch was proper,
the court relied primarily on the notion that Bosch, by incorporat-
ing RBNA and thereby taking advantage of the benefits of Delaware
law, had set in motion a chain of events which culminated in
RBNA's receipt of Borg-Warner's stock.13 9 The court's reliance
on this reasoning is justifiable to the extent that Bosch's incorpora-
tion of RBNA was a necessary cause of the transaction from which
plaintiff's claim arose: had Bosch not incorporated RBNA, the stock
exchange between RBNA and Borg-Warner would not have taken
place. However, the same argument could be made of a parent
corporation that incorporated a subsidiary three years prior to the
subsidiary's involvement in an alleged tort: had the subsidiary not
been incorporated, it would not have committed the tort. Yet
unlike the factual scenario in Papendick, the tort that was eventually
committed by the subsidiary in the latter example would not, in all
likelihood, have been within the parent's contemplation when the
subsidiary was incorporated three years earlier. The court's opinion
in Papendick lacks a requirement that the parent's jurisdictional act
bear a sufficiently close relationship to the ensuing litigation to
satisfy the United States Supreme Court's test for specific jurisdic-
tion outlined in Helicopteros.
140
Courts in Illinois have come close to making such a requirement
in their interpretations of the Illinois long-arm statute.141 In
137 See supra notes 75-84 and accompanying text. The exercise ofjurisdiction on
these grounds would have been consistent with both Cannon and the International Shoe
minimum contacts analysis. See supra notes 93-104 and accompanying text.
138 It is important to note that in cases such as this one, the action could have
been brought in the forum where the contract was entered into, Maryland, or in
Bosch's country of incorporation, West Germany. Thus, forums other than Delaware
were, in all probability, available to plaintiff.
'39 See supra text accompanying note 135.
140 Absent such a requirement, there may be cases involving different facts that
apply the reasoning of Papendick to exercise jurisdiction over a nonresident parent
corporation even though the relationship between the jurisdictional act and the
litigation is not sufficiently close to satisfy due process.
Had the court found that an agency or alter-egorelationship between Bosch and
RBNA existed, there would have been no question that plaintiff's harm was related
to Bosch's contacts with Delaware since RBNA's actions could be attributed to Bosch
under a general jurisdiction theory.
141 Delaware's long-arm statute is based on Illinois' statute. See Sears III, 752 F.
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order for jurisdiction to be present in Illinois, the jurisdictional act
(which the incorporation of RBNA represented in Papendick) must
be a "critical step[] in the chain of events" that culminates in the
cause of action before the court. 14 2 Although, the facts in Papen-
dick appear to support a finding of jurisdiction over Bosch under
the Illinois test, the Delaware Supreme Court did not adopt this
critical step requirement. Instead, the court used broad language
stating that minimum contacts between Delaware and Bosch existed
because Bosch, by incorporating RBNA and using it as a vehicle for
the contested transaction, had "purposefully availed itself of the
benefits and protections of the laws of the State of Delaware for
financial gain in activities related to the cause of action."
143
Thus, Papendick could be construed to permit the exercise of
jurisdiction over a parent whose act of incorporating a subsidiary
was not closely related to the cause of action.
144
The "critical step" test adopted by the Illinois courts seems to
increase the probability that the cause of action will be sufficiently
related to or arise from the parent corporation's act of incorporat-
ing the subsidiary to satisfy the Helicopteros specific jurisdiction
requirement. Nonetheless, the critical step test also has potential
deficiencies. The test could conceivably encompass some instances
Supp. 1223,1225 n.6 (D. Del. 1990) ("Delaware courts have traditionally relied on the
judicial interpretations of Illinois' long arm statute.., because Delaware's long arm
statute was modeled on that of Illinois.").
142 In re Oil Spill by Amoco Cadiz off Coast of France, 699 F.2d 909,917 (7th Cir.
1983), cert. denied sub nom., Astilleros Espanoles, S.A. v. Standard Oil Co., 464 U.S.
864 (1983) (emphasis added). In Sears III, the court adopted the Illinois court's line
of reasoning in ruling that jurisdiction was absent in Delaware for claims against
PLC's non-Delaware subsidiaries. See Sears III, 752 F. Supp. at 1227-28.
143 Papendick v. Bosch, 410 A.2d 148, 152 (Del. 1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 909
(1980).
144 In Red Sail Easter Ltd. Partners v. Radio City Music Hall Prods., No. 12036,
1991 Del. Ch. LEXIS 113 (July 10, 1991), plaintiffs asserted breach of contract claims
against a nonresident parent corporation and its Delaware subsidiaries. See id. at *1.
The nonresident parent corporation's only act in Delaware was to cause the
incorporation of its Delaware subsidiaries many years previously. See id. at *4. The
court ruled that the claims against the parent corporation were "in no sense" related
to the parent's having incorporated the subsidiaries in Delaware and that the cause
of action therefore did not "arise" from any acts committed by the parent corporation
in Delaware. Id. at *7. The court's decision in Red Sail was based on the absence of
jurisdiction under the Delaware long-arm statute, and a constitutional analysis was
therefore unnecessary. See id. at *6-*7. Still, the court's finding that defendant's
claims did not "arise" from the act of incorporation would presumably have been the
same under a constitutional analysis. Thus, the Delaware Chancery Court would
apparently construe Papendick narrowly, thereby avoiding the potential constitutional
problems that would arise if Papendick were construed broadly.
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in which the subsidiary's wrongful act really has little to do with the
parent's sole jurisdictional act of incorporating the subsidiary.
145
In such instances, the parent corporation would be subject to
jurisdiction for causes of action not arising from or related to the
jurisdictional acts of the parent in the state-a result violative of due
process under Helicopteros.
Rather than tolerate the critical step test's potential constitution-
al deficiencies, courts should examine the facts of each case to
determine whether the subsidiary was the alter-ego, instrumentality,
or agent of the parent. In such cases, courts could confidently
assert that the parent had sufficient control over the subsidiary's
role in the cause of action to make the parent amenable to
jurisdiction for claims arising out of the subsidiary's actions
wherever the subsidiary could be tried for such claims. This result
would be consistent with both the Cannon doctrine and the
International Shoe minimum contacts test.
146
As mentioned previously, the facts in Papendich clearly indicate
that the court could have found that RBNA had acted as Bosch's
agent, alter-ego, or instrumentality in the purchase of Borg-
Warner's shares, thereby rendering Bosch subject to Delaware's
jurisdiction. Therefore, the Delaware Supreme Court undoubtedly
reached the correct result in exercising jurisdiction over Bosch.
Notwithstanding the result, the reasoning underlying the court's
opinion in Papendick may potentially conflict with Cannon and the
International Shoe minimum contacts test.
3. Jurisdiction Over a Nonresident Parent by Virtue of
its Ownership of a Delaware Subsidiary
Sternberg v. O'Nei1 47 is the most controversial and potentially
far-reaching jurisdictional decision handed down by the Delaware
Supreme Court in the context of parent-subsidiary relationships.
Sternberg involved a double derivative action 148 against GenCorp,
145 For example, a parent might incorporate a subsidiary, and on the next day, an
employee of the subsidiary could negligently cause a fire in another state, perhaps in
the subsidiary's state of principal business. The act of incorporating the subsidiary
may well have been a critical step towards the occurrence of the next day's accident
since the employee would not even have had ajob with the subsidiary if it had not
existed. It is hard to imagine, though, how the act of incorporating the subsidiary
would actually be related to the fire.
146 See supra notes 93-104 and accompanying text.
147 550 A.2d 1105 (Del. 1988).
148 Double derivative suits enable shareholders of a parent corporation to sue on
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an Ohio corporation, and RKO General ("RKO"), a wholly owned
Delaware subsidiary of GenCorp. The complaint alleged that
officers and directors of GenCorp and RKO had breached their
fiduciary duties to GenCorp shareholders by making numerous false
and misleading statements to the FCC.
14 9
The Delaware Chancery Court dismissed the claims against
GenCorp for lack ofjurisdiction and against RKO for failure to join
an indispensable party, namely GenCorp. 5° The court recog-
nized that GenCorp, by registering to do business in Delaware, had
appointed an agent to receive service of process in Delaware and,
therefore, had arguably consented to general jurisdiction in
Delaware. 151 Nevertheless, the court ruled that the United States
Supreme Court's minimum contacts test must be met even in cases
where jurisdiction over a party is based on statutory consent.
1 52
The court noted that GenCorp's only contacts with Delaware were
its registration to do business in Delaware and its purchase of RKO
more than 30 years previously.153 These acts had no connection
behalf of a subsidiary even if the shareholders do not own any of the subsidiary's
stock. The action is based on the fact that the parent corporation, by virtue of its
ownership of the subsidiary's stock, has derivative rights to a cause of action
possessed by the subsidiary. Double derivative actions can redress wrongs directly
inflicted upon the parent corporation as well as those inflicted on the subsidiary. See
13 FLETCHER, supra note 2, § 5977 (1990 Supp.).
149 See Sternberg, 550 A.2d at 1108. Specifically, the complaint alleged that RKO
had failed to disclose an SEC investigation of GenCorp in license renewal proceedings
before the FCC. As a result, the FCC allegedly denied the license renewal application
of a Boston television station owned by RKO. See id.
150 See Sternberg v. O'Neil, 532 A.2d 993, 998-99 (Del. Ch. 1987), rev'd, 550 A.2d
1105 (Del. 1988).
151 See id. at 995.
152 See id. at 997. The court acknowledged that courts were split as to whether
statutory consent can constitute a proper basis for jurisdiction in the absence of
minimum contacts. The court was ultimately swayed by language in Burger King
which stated that where "forum-selection provisions have been obtained through
'freely negotiated' agreements and are not 'unreasonable and unjust,' ... their
enforcement does not offend due process." Id. (quoting Burger King Corp. v.
Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 472 n.14 (1985)). The court interpreted this language to
mean that any assertion ofjurisdiction must be "reasonable andjust," and therefore
minimum contacts must exist even when a corporation has statutorily consented to
jurisdiction by registering to do business in a state. Id. In light of Asahi, the chancery
court could have also adopted the position that this was one of the rare instances
where even though minimum contacts may have been established by GenCorp's
statutory consent to jurisdiction, the exercise ofjurisdiction would nevertheless be
unreasonable and unconstitutional. See Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court, 480
U.S. 102, 116 (1987) (Brennan, J., concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment); supra notes 55-57 and accompanying text.
S See Sternberg, 532 A.2d at 998.
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to the litigation and, as a result, minimum contacts between
GenCorp and Delaware were lacking. 5
The Delaware Supreme Court reversed the chancery court's
decision on two grounds. First, the court ruled that jurisdiction
based on voluntary express consent, exhibited by registering to do
business in a state and appointing an agent to receive service of
process, was a "valid basis for the exercise of general jurisdiction in
the absence of any other basis for the exercise of jurisdiction, i.e.
'minimum contacts.'" ' 5 The court's analysis could easily have
ended there. GenCorp would then have had to defend itself in the
Delaware courts due to its express consent to general jurisdiction in
Delaware.
The decision did not end there, however, and the language that
followed could have a major impact on future jurisdictional
decisions based on the parent-subsidiary relationship. The court
went on to hold that in a double derivative action, a foreign
corporation's ownership of a Delaware corporate subsidiary
constitutes a due process minimum contact sufficient for Delaware
courts to exercise jurisdiction over the parent corporation.
156
One of the most important factors in the Sternberg court's determi-
nation that GenCorp had established minimum contacts with
Delaware was GenCorp's decision to operate RKO as a Delaware
corporation for more than thirty years:
The decision to reincorporate or not to reincorporate in a
particular jurisdiction is a deliberate one ....
Although scholars may debate its motivation, the fact remains
that ... GenCorp has made the conscious decision to operate
RKO ... as a Delaware corporation. For more than thirty years,
GenCorp has benefitted from the protections of the Delaware law
in operating RKO .... We conclude that GenCorp intentionally
established and maintained minimum contacts with Delaware by its
decision to continue to operate its wholly owned subsidiary, RKO
General, as a Delaware corporation.1
5 7
154 See id.
155 Sternberg v. O'Neil, 550 A.2d 1105, 1111 (Del. 1988).
156 See id. at 1125.
15 7 Id. at 1121-22 (emphasis added). The court also ruled that the fact that RKO
was purchased rather than incorporated by GenCorp was a distinction without
significance in its minimum contacts analysis. See id. at 1121. This rulingisjustifiable
because both the act of incorporating a subsidiary and the act of purchasing a
subsidiary can be considered "jurisdictional acts" in the subsidiary's state of
incorporation. UnderHelicoptners, specificjurisdiction would therefore be present for
litigation arising out of either of these acts. The problem with Steinberg is that it is
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Having ruled that minimum contacts existed, the court went on to
evaluate those contacts in light of other considerations in order to
determine whether the assertion of personal jurisdiction would pass
constitutional muster. The other factors which the court examined
included a finding that Delaware had "an interest in holding
accountable those responsible for the operation of a Delaware
corporation,"158 and that a single proceeding would be an effi-
cient way to resolve the double derivative suit.1 59 The court also
noted that the state of incorporation of the subsidiary might be the
only forum in which both the parent and subsidiary could be sued
in a double derivative action.1 60 These considerations "com-
pelled" the court to conclude that Delaware courts could exercise
jurisdiction over GenCorp.
161
The court did briefly address the issue of whether jurisdiction
might be proper based on an analysis of the nature of the parent-
subsidiary relationship. Such an analysis would involve an examina-
tion of the extent to which GenCorp controlled RKO and/or
whether the separation between GenCorp and RKO should be
recognized at all. 162 Although the court recognized the merit of
such an approach and implied that jurisdiction over GenCorp could
have been based on such findings, the court made clear that its
"analysis [made] it unnecessary to base a finding of specific
jurisdiction upon ... these theories."
163
Curiously, the court did pay lip service to the Cannon doctrine
by confirming that "[j]urisdiction over a wholly owned Delaware
subsidiary does not automatically establish jurisdiction over the
parent corporation in any forum."164 Despite its mention, the
difficult to envision how plaintiff's derivative claim "arose" from GenCorp's purchase
of RKO 30 years previously.
158 Id. at 1123.
159 See id. at 1124.
160 See id.
161 See id. at 1125. Whether these considerations "compelled" the court to
exercise jurisdiction over GenCorp is arguable. Still, these case-specific consider-
ations do present strong arguments in favor of exercisingjurisdiction over GenCorp
in this particular case. See infra notes 189-92 and accompanying text. The
encompassing language in Sternberg implies, however, that the exercise ofjurisdiction
over parent corporations would be constitutionally permissible even when the
litigation is not in the form of a double derivative suit.
162 See Sternberg, 550 A.2d at 1125-26 n.45 (citing Brilmayer & Paisley, supra note
60, in their analysis of when courts may exercisejurisdiction over parent corporations
based on the actions of the parents' subsidiaries).
163 Id. at 1126 n.45.
164 Id. at 1119-20 (emphasis omitted) (citing Cannon Mfg. Co. v. Cudahy Packing
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Cannon doctrine apparently played no role in the court's determina-
tion that the basic decision to operate a subsidiary as a Delaware
corporation constitutes a minimum contact sufficient to satisfy due
process in the jurisdictional context. 165 The Cannon doctrine
would be devoid of meaning if the decision to operate a subsidiary
in a particular state were a sufficient minimum contact for that state
to exercise jurisdiction over the parent corporation.
4. The Scope of Sternberg
To this author's knowledge, no other state or federal court
decisions that involved suits against a parent and subsidiary in the
subsidiary's state of incorporation have based a grant ofjurisdiction
over nonresident parent corporations on the reasoning used in
Sternberg.166  Furthermore, even Delaware's lower courts have
construed Sternberg narrowly. In Red Sail Easter Ltd. Partners v.
Radio City Music Hall Productions,167 plaintiff claimed that the
Sternberg holding authorized Delaware courts to exercise personal
jurisdiction over parent corporations in any causes of action arising
out of the operation of Delaware subsidiaries. 168 The chancery
court noted that this principle would be "breath-taking in scope. It
would apply for example to support jurisdiction over a New York
corporation that owned a Delaware subsidiary whose employee was
involved, during the course of his employment, in an intersection
collision in Los Angeles." 169 In Red Sail, the court ultimately held
that jurisdiction over the nonresident parent was not authorized by
Co., 267 U.S. 333 (1925)).
165 See supra text accompanying note 157.
166 See e.g., Bielicki v. Empire Stevedoring Co., 741 F. Supp. 758 (D. Minn. 1990)
(adhering to the Cannon doctrine in holding that jurisdiction over the parent of a
local subsidiary was not unconstitutional); Afros S.P.A. v. Krauss-Maffei Corp., 624
F. Supp. 464 (D. Del. 1985) (holding that due process requires more than the
ownership of a Delaware subsidiary in order to exert jurisdiction over a parent
corporation in a patent infringement suit), aff'd, 848 F.2d 1244 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (this
holding is arguably no longer valid in light of Sternberg); J.M. Sahlein Music Co. v.
Nippon Gakki Co., 243 Cal. Rptr. 4 (Ct. App. 1987) (dismissing claims against the
parent in a suit against a parent and subsidiary in the subsidiary's state of incorpora-
tion for lack ofjurisdiction on due process grounds); Yarborough & Co. v. Schoolfield
Furniture Indus., Inc., 268 S.E.2d 42, 44 & n.1 (S.C. 1980) (citing Cannon in its
holding that the "mere acquisition and control of a domestic subsidiary's capital stock
does not subject the foreign parent to the jurisdiction of that State's courts," and
dismissing the action on due process grounds).
167 No. 12036, 1991 Del. Ch. LEXIS 113 (July 10, 1991).
168 Id. at *3.
169 Id. at *4 n.2.
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Delaware's long-arm statute,170 and the court therefore never
reached the issue of whether jurisdiction would have been constitu-
tional under the Stemnberg analysis. 17 ' The Red Sail holding is not
necessarily inconsistent with Stemnberg because Stemnberg did not
consider whether jurisdiction over GenCorp would have been valid
under Delaware's long-arm statute.
172
Clearly, the implications of the Delaware Supreme Court's
decision in Stenberg will depend on how broadly its holding is
applied in future cases. If, as Red Sail would seem to indicate, the
Delaware long-arm statute would prohibit the exercise of jurisdic-
tion where the facts are similar to those in Stemnberg (assuming
170 In order to lay within the reach of the Delaware long-arm statute's provisions
for specificjurisdiction, a claim must arise from a transaction of business in Delaware
or a defendant must have caused a tortious injury in Delaware by an act or omission
in Delaware. See DEL CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 3104 (Supp. 1990). In ruling that the
provisions of the long-arm statute had not been met, the court ruled that the claims
did not arise from the transaction of business in Delaware (i.e. the incorporation of
the subsidiaries) and that the act of forming the subsidiaries in Delaware was "no part
of any wrong (in [Delaware] or outside of it)." Red Sail, 1991 Del. Ch. LEXIS 113, at
*7-*8.
171 See Red Sail, 1991 Del. Ch. LEXIS 113, at *5-*6. In the Red Sail litigation, the
chancery court did eventually directly confront the issue ofwhetherjurisdiction over
the nonresident parent corporation would have been constitutional under the
Sternberg analysis. See Red Sail Easter Ltd. Partners v. Radio City Music Hall Prods.,
No. 12036, 1992 Del. Ch. LEXIS 143 (July 17, 1992). The chancery court construed
Stemnbergvery narrowly and held that Sternbergwas a "double derivative suit exception
to the general rule that ownership of stock in [sic] corporation does not ususally
count as an affiliating contact for 'minimum contact' purposes." Id. at *16. The
chancery court's July 17, 1992 opinion was, however, withdrawn one week after
having been issued, and it is consequently of no precedential value. See Red Sail
Easter Ltd. Partners v. Radio City Music Hall Prods., No. 12036, 1992 WL 181030
(Del. Ch.July 23,1992) (withdrawing theJuly 17,1992 Red Sail opinion and ordering
that it not be circulated to law libraries or computer data base services).
172 Red Sail may, however, be inconsistent with previous Delaware Supreme Court
decisions which state that the Delaware long-arm statute confers jurisdiction to the
maximum extent allowed by the Constitution. See infra notes 173-74 and accompany-
ing text.
The only other recent decision interpreting the scope of Stenberg is Applied
Biosystems, Inc. v. Cruachem, Ltd., 772 F. Supp. 1458 (D. Del. 1991). In Cruachem,
the court analyzed the constitutionality of exercisingjurisdiction over a nonresident
parent of a subsidiary for injuries occurring outside of Delaware. In the court's
constitutional analysis, the only mention of Steinberg was that it authorized "the
exercise of specific jurisdiction in a suit involving the duties and responsibilities of
Delaware corporations." Id. at 1471 (emphasis omitted). The court went on to say
that Steinberg did "not support the proposition that ownership of a Delaware
subsidiary qualifies as a continuous and systematic contact with Delaware under a
general jurisdiction theory." Id. Thus, Cruachem does little to define the scope of
Steinberg other than to point out that the Steinberg court did not purport to be
exercising general jurisdiction over GenCorp by virtue of its ownership of RKO.
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GenCorp had not consented to general jurisdiction), then the
court's holding in Steinberg will have little significance (except to
reinforce the constitutionality of exercising jurisdiction over parties
that have consented to such jurisdiction under applicable Delaware
statutes). The Red Sail holding may, however, be overturned in light
of a previous holding by the Delaware Supreme Court that the
Delaware long-arm statute should be "construed to confer jurisdic-
tion to the maximum extent possible under the due process
clause."1 73 Furthermore, even if the Delaware state long-arm
statute would not permit jurisdiction under the facts in Sternberg, it
could always be amended to permit jurisdiction to the maximum
extent possible under the Constitution.
174
Assuming, arguendo, that the Delaware long-arm statute did
permit the exercise ofjurisdiction so long as it were compatible with
due process, an argument can be made that the language in
Sternberg is so broad that it confers general jurisdiction upon
Delaware courts over nonresident parent corporations who choose
to avail themselves of the benefits of Delaware law by incorporating
or purchasing subsidiaries in Delaware. If this is the appropriate
construction of the Delaware Supreme Court's holding, then the
decision is almost certainly unconstitutional. Such a construction
would permit the exercise of jurisdiction over parent corporations
in claims completely unrelated not only to the forum state, but also
to the subsidiary incorporated in the forum state. In Shaffer, the
United States Supreme Court squarely rejected the notion that the
mere ownership of property in the forum state could serve as a
constitutional basis for exercising jurisdiction over the property
owner.
175
A narrower and more reasonable reading of Sternberg is that a
173 LaNuova D & B v. Bowe Co., 513 A.2d 764, 768 (Del. 1986). In Red Sail,
Chancellor Allen argued that, in his opinion, "the [Delaware] Supreme Court did not
intend in LaNuova to direct the trial court to ignore the specific words of [Delaware's
long-arm statute] and to henceforth analyze all questions arisingunder [the long-arm
statute] only in the broad terms of fundamental fairness that guide the determination
of the constitutional question." Red Sail, 1991 Del. Ch. LEXIS 113, at *11.
174 Many states do permitjurisdiction to the maximum extent possible under the
Constitution. See e.g., CAL. CiV. PROC. CODE § 410.10 (West 1973) (delegating to
each court in California "the power to exercise jurisdiction on any basis or contact
not denied it by the... federal Constitution"). If states such as California were to
employ a Sternbeirg-type analysis in exercising jurisdiction over nonresident parent
corporations, the parent corporations could persuasively argue that their constitution-
al rights had been violated.
7 See Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 209 (1977).
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court's jurisdiction over a nonresident parent is constitutionally
permissible whenever the subsidiary plays a role in bringing about
the cause of action. Such an exercise ofjurisdiction would be more
analogous to "specific" rather than "general" jurisdiction since the
parent would not be amenable to suit in the subsidiary's state of
incorporation in claims completely unrelated to the subsidiary.
It could be argued that Sternberg should be construed even more
narrowly and that jurisdiction over a nonresident parent should be
limited to instances where the subsidiary was acting pursuant to the
laws of its state of incorporation. This argument is based on the
premise that the parent only availed itself of the benefits of the laws
of the state of incorporation in its decision to operate the subsidiary
there, and therefore only actions taken pursuant to those laws
should subject a parent to jurisdiction.1 76 The parent could not,
however, be brought into the courts of its subsidiary's state of
incorporation if the litigation was related to acts committed by the
subsidiary in other states pursuant to the laws of those states.
177
It is quite possible that the Stenberg court had this latter construc-
tion in mind when it held that jurisdiction was proper "to hear and
decide Sternberg's double derivative complaint"178 and did not
discuss the constitutionality of such jurisdiction in other types of
actions.1 79 This very narrow reading of Sternberg constitutes a
very tenuous limitation on the court's holding. Much of the
language in Stenberg is very broad, and does not appear to be
limited to situations involving double derivative suits. Furthermore,
the very existence of a subsidiary is made possible by the laws of its
state of incorporation. Therefore, any actions the subsidiary takes
are made possible by the laws of the subsidiary's state of incorpora-
tion and any benefits that the parent corporation derives from the
actions of its subsidiary are made possible by the laws of that state
as well.
176 For example, a Delaware subsidiary may effectuate a merger or sign a contract
pursuant to the laws of Delaware. A parent would be subject to jurisdiction in
Delaware in any litigation arising from such acts.177 The parent would not be subject to jurisdiction in its subsidiary's state of
incorporation, for example, in a products liability suit arising from the subsidiary's
manufacture and sale of a product in another state.
178 Sternberg v. O'Neil, 550 A.2d 1105, 1125 (Del. 1988).
179 A double derivative suit clearly falls into the category of cases that involve the
laws of the subsidiary's state of incorporation in that those laws define the duties of
officers and directors of the subsidiary.
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5. The Constitutionality of Sternberg
Constitutionally, it makes little difference which of the two
above "narrower" readings of Sternberg is the most appropriate one.
Sternberg's holding is constitutionally suspect regardless of whether
it applies to any actions of the subsidiary or only to actions taken by
the subsidiary which are controlled by the law of its state of
incorporation, especially since the Cannon doctrine arguably still
constitutes good law.1 80 The court in Sternberg chose not to
consider the nature of the relationship between GenCorp and RKO
(in terms of assessing the extent to which GenCorp controlled
RKO);l1l instead, its decision was based on the mere existence of
the parent-subsidiary relationship and the existence of that
relationship for a period of over thirty years.1 8 2 Such a basis for
exerting jurisdiction over a non-resident parent corporation was
squarely rejected in Cannon.
l8 3
The Sternberg decision may not pass constitutional scrutiny even
under the assumption that the Cannon doctrine has been completely
superseded by International Shoe and its progeny, although its
validity rests on stronger footing under such an assumption. The
first hurdle that the Sternberg decision would have to pass is the
United States Supreme Court's decision in Shaffer. The exercise of
specific jurisdiction over GenCorp resembled the very type of
jurisdiction that the Shaffer Court appeared to reject: jurisdiction
based solely on the ownership of property (i.e., RKO's stock) within
the forum state.
18 4
180 See supra notes 58-84 and accompanying text. Even in jurisdictions that have
rejected the Cannon doctrine, the holding in Sterinberg would be suspect because
courts in many suchjurisdictions tend to examine the nature of the parent-subsidiary
relationship (i.e., the extent to which the parent controls the subsidiary), rather than
the mere existence of such a relationship, in reachingjurisdictional conclusions. See
supra notes 70-74 and accompanying text.
I1 See Sternberg, 550 A.2d at 1121.
182 See id. at 1122.
183 Jurisdiction based solely on the existence of a parent-subsidiary relationship
was also apparently rejected in Keeton. Seesupra notes 62-63 and accompanying text.
184 See supra notes 26 & 93-97 and accompanying text. As mentioned previously,
the Shaffer court implied that had the Delaware Legislature enacted some sort of
consent statute whereby persons becoming officers and directors of Delaware
corporations would be deemed to have consented to jurisdiction over themselves in
Delaware, such a statute would have been upheld. See Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S.
186, 216 (1977). An argument can be made that if Delaware adopted a statute
whereby parent corporations that decide to incorporate or purchase Delaware
subsidiaries are deemed to have consented to generaljurisdiction in Delaware, then
jurisdiction over any parent of a Delaware subsidiary would be valid. Clearly, the
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Under World-Wide Volkswagen it is questionable whether a
nonresident parent corporation can "reasonably anticipate" being
haled into court in its subsidiary's state of incorporation when the
only contact the parent has with the forum is the ownership of the
subsidiary for a significant period of time. 185 Since the purpose
of creating a subsidiary is to limit the substantive liability of the
parent for actions of the subsidiary, a parent might reasonably
expect that it will not be forced to defend itself in the subsidiary's
state of incorporation absent some sort of piercing of the corporate
veil. The Sternberg court relied on the notion that a parent
"purposefully avails" itself of the laws of the forum state when it
decides to operate a subsidiary in that state1 8 6 (and, therefore,
presumably the parent should reasonably anticipate being haled into
the courts of that state). This argument is suspect because it
renders ownership of virtually any property within a forum to be
purposeful availment of the forum's laws. Under this line of
reasoning, the purchase of barren land would arguably constitute
purposeful availment of a state's property tax laws, yet the purchas-
er can hardly be said to have availed herself of the state's laws
sufficiently to expect to have to defend herself in suits unrelated to
the ownership of the land itself.
187
Finally, the Supreme Court's decision in Asahi also raises doubts
as to Steinberg's constitutional validity even if the Delaware Supreme
Court was correct in determining that a parent establishes minimum
contacts with Delaware by choosing to operate a subsidiary there.
Asahi made clear that in some instances, jurisdiction over a
nonresident party may offend traditional notions of fair play and
substantial justice even if that party has minimum contacts with the
Delaware Supreme Court would find such a manner of exercisingjurisdiction valid
in light of its Sternberg holding that express consent to jurisdiction suffices even in the
absence of minimum contacts with the forum state. See Sternberg, 550 A.2d at 1111.
However, such a statute could be held unconstitutional if the Supreme Court were
to unequivocally hold that the Cannon doctrine is still valid law. Furthermore, the
Supreme Court has not equivocally sustained or rejected the constitutional validity
ofjurisdiction based on express consent in the absence of independent minimum
contacts. For a thorough discussion of this issue, see id. at 1111-16; Sternberg v.
O'Neil, 532 A.2d 993, 995-97 (Del. Ch. 1987), rev'd, 550 A.2d 1105 (Del. 1988).
18 5 See supra notes 36 & 98-99 and accompanying text.
'86 See Sternberg, 550 A.2d at 1120 (quoting Papendick v. Bosch, 410 A.2d 148, 152
(Del. 1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 909 (1980)).
187 The Sternberg decision may be defensible to the extent that the "purchaser"
would only have to defend herself in the forum state against causes of actions related
to the property she "purchased." Still, this line of reasoning was apparently rejected
in Shaffer. See supra notes 93-97 and accompanying text.
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forum state."'8 Thus, even if a parent's decision to incorporate
a subsidiary in another state is considered a "minimum contact"
with the state, it may well be the case that exercising jurisdiction
over the parent would be unconstitutional, especially if the parent
has no connection to that state other than ownership of its
subsidiary's stock.
The strongest arguments supporting the constitutional validity
of Stern berg stem from the case-specific facts. The court was surely
correct in noting that the most efficient disposition of a double
derivative suit would be through litigation in a single forum.
1 8 9
In fact, a double derivative suit can only be litigated in one forum:
if either defendant cannot be joined in the suit, the suit must be
dismissed for failure to join an indispensable party.1 90 As a
result, it is possible that the subsidiary's state of incorporation may
be the only forum in which a suit such as the one that the court
faced in Sternberg can be litigated at all. 191 Still, the court consid-
ered these factors only after having determined that GenCorp had
"intentionally established and maintained minimum contacts with
Delaware."
192
Thus, the case-specific facts in Sternberg may justify the court's
determination that Delaware courts could constitutionally exercise
jurisdiction over GenCorp. However, the court's determination that
GenCorp established minimum contacts with Delaware by deciding
to purchase and operate a subsidiary there seems to have been
based on a faulty constitutional analysis. The court simply ignored
the Cannon doctrine, and its analysis is, at best, questionable under
International Shoe and its progeny. Thus, the holding in Sternberg-
that a parent corporation establishes minimum contacts with a
forum when it decides to operate a subsidiary there-will, in all
probability, be deemed unconstitutional if a similar constitutional
analysis is applied in the context of claims other than double
derivative suits where there are alternative forums to sue the parent
corporation.
188 See supra notes 45 & 102-03 and accompanying text.
189 See Steinberg, 550 A.2d at 1124.
190 See id.
191 See id. In Shaffer, the United States Supreme Court left open the possibility
that the presence of defendant's property (in this case, the stock of the subsidiary) in
the forum might be a sufficient basis forjurisdiction even in the absence of minimum
contacts when no alternative forums are available to the plaintiff. See Shaffer v.
Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 211 n.37 (1977).
192 Stenberg, 550 A.2d at 1122.
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CONCLUSION
The above analysis reveals that a nonresident corporation's
decision to incorporate, purchase and/or operate a subsidiary as a
Delaware corporation will most likely be within the constitutional
reach of the Delaware courts. Such a result is clearly justified and
constitutional if the subsidiary is a mere instrumentality, alter-ego,
or agent of the parent corporation, or if the parent corporation's
very jurisdictional act (of incorporating a subsidiary, for example)
gives rise to the claims against it. A persuasive argument can be
made, however, that the exercise of jurisdiction over a parent
corporation would be inconsistent with Cannon and would not
comport with due process if the parent's specific jurisdictional act
did not give rise to or was not related to the cause of action. A
broad reading of the Delaware Supreme Court's decisions in
Papendick and Sternberg indicates that the court has apparently
rejected this argument. Because those decisions have been
construed narrowly by Delaware's lower courts, however, the extent
to which nonresident parent corporations will be forced to defend
themselves in the Delaware courts is unclear.
Part of the confusion surrounding the question of when the
exercise of jurisdiction over a parent corporation based on its
ownership of a subsidiary is constitutionally valid is due to the lack
of specific United States Supreme Court guidance in this area. In
particular, lower courts have struggled in determining how to apply
the Cannon doctrine, if at all. Still, the Supreme Court's minimum
contacts test first adopted in International Shoe does offer some
guidelines which lower state and federal courts are bound to follow
and most courts seem to adhere to the principles set out in Cannon
as well. Many aspects of the Delaware Supreme Court's constitu-
tional analysis in its Sternberg and Papendick decisions are at odds
with the United States Supreme Court's jurisdictional due process
guidelines. As a result, the analysis in Sternberg and Papendick may
not withstand the scrutiny of the United States Supreme Court, if
it is extended to claims involving slightly different factual scenarios.
In light of the policy arguments favoring the treatment of a parent
and subsidiary as separate corporate entities for jurisdictional
purposes when they are, in fact, operated as separate corporations,
a rejection of the Sternberg and Papendick analysis is warranted.
